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ABSTRACT
An abstract of the thesis of Jessica Marie Morea for the Master of Science in
Psychology presented May 26, 2006.
Title: Conceptualizing and Measuring the Self in Chronic Illness and its Relationship
to Adjustment
This research sought to clarify the role of the self in chronic illness by
developing and evaluating several new constructs, which intend to describe the extent
to which illness permeates the self-concept. Following the works of Lewin and Asch,
the concepts of central and peripheral regions of the self were elaborated to describe
the state of illness within the self, termed "illness self-concept".
Three subsidiary constructs were introduced to further depict illness self-
concept: directionality, pervasiveness, and illness self-consciousness. Directionality
refers to whether illness drives the self or self drives illness. Pervasiveness refers to
whether illness affects many or few regions of the self. Illness self-consciousness
refers to the degree of preoccupation with illness. A 23-item scale was developed to
assess illness self-concept (ex= .94), with items addressing each construct. A 14-item
scale measuring "illness self-concept support" (ISC Support, ex= .89) was
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developed to assess whether family and friends reinforce illness as central or
peripheral to the self.
I hypothesized that illness self-concept relates to adjustment such that the more
illness is peripheral to the self, the better the adjustment. My second hypothesis was
that personal, interpersonal, and illness-related factors would influence illness self-
concept. The third hypothesis was that illness self-concept would predict additional
variance in adjustment after controlling for each of these factors.
Fibromyalgia patients (n = 109) completed measures of illness self-concept,
optimism, ISC support, illness intrusiveness, and functional status. Results supported
hypothesis one, indicating that illness self-concept significantly predicted quality of
life (R2!'J. = .39) and depression (R2!'J. = .24). Results supported hypothesis two,
indicating that ISC support, optimism, illness intrusiveness and functional status each
contribute to illness self-concept. Results supported hypothesis three, indicating that
illness self-concept predicted substantial variance in adjustment even after controlling
for personal, interpersonal, and illness-related factors.
All three hypotheses were strongly supported, indicating that illness self-
concept is an important predictor of adjustment in chronic illness. This study
demonstrated that the extent to which illness permeates the self-concept has
implications for adjustment in fibromyalgia, and may be an important variable in
improving psychological adjustment in other chronic illnesses.
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Introduction
The onset and course of a chronic illness often result in disruptions in the lives
of those who suffer. Individual reactions to these interferences vary and can have
important consequences for the self. Such interferences in valued activities and
important life domains have been labeled as illness intrusiveness (Devins, Yitzchak, et
aI., 1983). Many studies have shown that illness intrusiveness has a negative impact
on depression and quality oflife in a variety of chronic illnesses, including end-stage
renal disease, rheumatoid arthritis, multiple sclerosis, asthma and diabetes (Devins,
Armstrong, et aI., 1990; Devins, Edworthy, Seland et aI., 1993; Devins, Mandin, et aI.,
1990; Devins, Mann, et aI., 1990; Devins, Seland, et aI., 1993; Devins, Yitzchak, et
aI., 1983-84; Eitel, Hatchett, Friend, Griffin, & Wadhwa, 1995; Littlefield, et aI.,
1996; Mullens, Chaney, Balderson, & Hommel, 2000; Peterson et aI., 1991; Talbot,
Nouwen, Gingras, Belanger, & Audet, 1999). A related but broader concept, illness
effects, is concerned with how illness and treatment disrupt somatic, psychological
and interpersonal life domains (Greenberg & Peterson, 1997). The primary purpose of
this research is to conceptualize the self in the course of chronic illness. A secondary
purpose is to describe how illness intrusiveness and other personal and interpersonal
variables are related to illness self-concept and adjustment to chronic illness.
To the extent that a person's self-concept is defined in terms of their goals,
activities, and major life domains, it follows that disruptions to these may challenge
the self-concept. Two studies have attempted to establish a relationship between the
degree of illness disruption and the self-concept (Beanlands et aI., 2003; Devins,
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Beanlands, Mandin, & Paul, 1997). Beanlands et al. used the semantic differential
technique to obtain a measure of participants' self-concept. Participants assessed a
typical bone marrow transplant patient (BMT) and "myself as I am now" on three
major dimensions: evaluation (good-bad, kind-cruel), potency (strong-weak, hard-
soft), and activity (active-passive, rash-cautious). If the difference scores between a
participant's assessment of a BMT patient and "myself as I am now" was great, the
self-concept was determined to be dissimilar to a BMT patient. If the distance was
small, the participant's self-concept was determined to be similar to a BMT patient.
Results show that illness intrusiveness had a small but significant correlation (r =.27)
with this measure of self-concept (similarity to a BMT patient). Engulfment, defined
as the extent to which illness comes to dominate the self-concept (McCay & Seeman,
1998), was also measured (BeanJands et al., 2003). Surprisingly, no significant
relationship between engulfinent and self-concept was found (r=.I5), indicating that
similarity to a BMT patient may not adequately capture illness self-concept.
A similar study with end-stage renal disease (ESRD) patients attempted to link
self-concept, using the same semantic differential technique, to adjustment to chronic
illness (Devins, Beanlands, Mandin & Leenert, 1997). However, no simple
relationship between self-concept and adjustment was observed. Only complicated
interactions between illness intrusiveness, age, and self-concept were related to
psychosocial well-being and emotional distress. One possible explanation is that
similarity or dissimilarity to an ESRD patient does not sufficiently characterize illness
self-concept. Devins et al. found that perceived similarity to an ESRD patient was
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associated with a self-view that was active and weak (compared to perceived
dissimilarity) but was not associated with a self-view of good or bad. This suggests
that reported similarity/dissimilarity to an ESRD patient may not represent a negative
or positive self-concept. This might explain why self-concept, using the semantic
differential technique, does not relate to adjustment, illness intrusiveness, or
engulfinent.
A major limitation of these studies is a focus on how the self-concept is
dominated by illness and not how people are often able to withstand chronic illness
and preserve their sense of non-illness self (Symister & Friend, 1996). For example,
the semantic differential technique assesses similarity to a BMT or ESRD patient but
does not assess similarity to a healthy person. No research has examined how the self
can be protected from illness and its effects. Particularly, research has not examined
how the self-concept can be sustained in the face of chronic illness. The major purpose
of this study is to articulate a more precise and inclusive framework for understanding
how the self responds to illness, either by preserving the self or by allowing illness to
define the self.
Although there is a body of research on the self-concept in general (Ashmore
& Jussim, 1997; Byrne, 1996; Markus & Nurius, 1986; Oyserman, 2004), and others
have suggested a relationship between illness and self-concept (Ashmore & Contrada,
1999; Charmaz, 1999; Leventhal, Idler, & Leventhal, 1999; Ouellette, 1999), no
adequate framework appears to describe the relationship between illness and the self.
The current research is an attempt to generate constructs that help to clarify and assess
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the extent to which the sense of self is preserved or becomes defined by illness. It will
also examine personal, interpersonal, and illness-related factors (e.g., illness effects)
that may help sustain self-concept or make it more vulnerable to domination by
illness. We propose that those who are able to sustain their self-concept will be better
adjusted than those whose self-concept becomes dominated by illness, in terms of both
quality of life and depressive mood.
The notion of a self-concept has been defined in a variety of ways in the
psychological literature. Many have theorized that the self-concept is the most central
concept in psychology and is necessary in order to understand individual people and
their behavior (Epstein, 1973). Self-concept has been described as an active agent that
is influenced by its environment and experiences as well as influential in its
environment. Ithas also been described as a mediator in many intrapersonal and
interpersonal processes, such as with information processing, affect, and social
perception (Markus & Wurf, 1987). The idea of self-concept as mediator implies that
the self is the agent of change as information and experience enter the self and leave in
an altered form as behavior, attitude, or other outcome. The relationship between self-
concept and illness has been suggested to take several different forms. These include
illness as challenging previous ideas about the self, the need to reconstruct the self
when illness is encountered, and the emergence of a "sick role" that takes over one's
identity (Charmaz, 1999; Leventhal, Idler & Leventhal, 1999). (Note that the latter
two citations refer to theories and ideas put forth in the authors' work and do not refer
to systematic research in these areas.)
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In order to understand how illness is related to the self, I draw on Lewin (1951)
and Asch (1952) and their concepts of central and peripheral regions of the life space.
Following these authors, I characterize the self-concept in terms of central and
peripheral regions. Central regions lie close to the core of the self (Asch, 1952, p.280)
and affect many other regions of the life space. The state of the whole self is
dependent on the state of the central regions (Lewin, 1951, p.123). Peripheral regions
of the self, on the other hand, are dependent on the central regions for direction. For
the purposes of explaining the current research, two concepts are introduced: illness
peripheral to self (IPS) and illness central to self (ICS) (Chiaramonte & Friend, 2005).
Illness central to self (ICS) refers to the condition under which illness becomes one of
the central regions ofthe life space. When illness is a central region of the self, it acts
as a fundamental force driving goals, needs, actions, and relationships, and affecting
many other regions of the life space. Illness peripheral to self (IPS) refers to the
condition under which the core part of the self is preserved in spite of illness, and the
illness is contained to a peripheral region of the life space. When illness is a peripheral
part of the self, it is not a driving force and may even be seen as a constructive
challenge rather than a burden.
IPS and ICS represent two extreme ends of a continuum, with most people
falling somewhere in between. Those on the IPS end of the continuum have sustained
more of an overall, non-illness identity than those at the ICS end. People are assumed
to differ in the extent to which the illness is incorporated as a central or peripheral part
of the self. In addition to individual differences, illness-related and environmental
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factors (e.g., disease severity; supportive or problematic environment) also influence
the process of integration of illness into the self. Furthermore, changes in illness-
related factors (e.g., course of the illness) or the environment may also signal a change
from IPS to Ies or the reverse.
This research proposes that the relationship between illness and the self is
characterized by three interdependent constructs: directionality, pervasiveness, and
self-consciousness. These constructs help describe the state of illness within the life
space. The first construct, directionality, specifies the causal relationship between the
illness and the self, and whether the illness drives the self or the self drives the illness.
Ifthe self is the driving force, then needs, actions, goals and relationships are
interpreted in light of the self, and illness is peripheral. Ifthe illness drives the self
then needs, actions, goals, and relationships are all interpreted in light of the illness.
The second construct is pervasiveness. When an illness is pervasive many parts
of the life space are affected. When an illness is not pervasive (i.e., it is contained),
few regions ofthe life space are affected. If the illness is driving the self it is a central
region, and will thus affect many parts of the self. If the self is the driving force,
illness is peripheral and many parts of the life space are protected from the illness. The
idea of pervasiveness is similar to Wright's (1983) concept of spread. She defines
spread as the bringing together of different personal traits based on their similarity of
valence as positive or negative (p.61). The concept of spread claims that people tend
to perceive themselves and others as either all positive or all negative. It is this
principle of consistency and balance that explains how illness can spread to many
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parts of the self. If illness is viewed negatively in a person, other parts of the same
person come to be viewed negatively as well (cf. Wright, 1983).
The third concept, illness self-consciousness, refers to the extent to which
individuals are preoccupied with their illness. People who rarely think about their
illness are said to be low in illness self-consciousness. People who are preoccupied
with their illness are said to be high in illness self-consciousness. When the self drives
illness, and illness influences few regions of the life space, illness self-consciousness
is likely to be low. People whose illness is a peripheral region of the self may think
about their illness but not incessantly. Conversely, when illness drives the self, and is
pervasive across many parts of the self, individuals will likely be high in illness self-
consciousness.
Asch (1952) discusses the consequence of having a self and explains that
people who see themselves as both an object and a source of experience. He labels this
awareness of our experience as self-consciousness and claims that it makes self-regard
possible. Consciousness of oneself as ill can elicit greater effort and pride in how one
handles being ill, or it can result in judgment and disappointment in oneself for having
an illness. Asch argues that having consciousness frees individuals from being
influenced exclusively by immediate situational factors. Individuals' consciousness of
all of their collective experiences provides a context in which to formulate self regard
in a specific situation, such as illness.
In this research, we consider that individuals' degree of optimism, as well as
supportive and problematic relationships, influence their self-consciousness about
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illness, how they reflect upon the experience of being ill and how they regard
themselves in their illness. These factors influence self-consciousness because they
contribute to the context in which people regard themselves. With greater optimism,
individuals will reflect more positively on themselves and their illness. Itmay be that
people who are optimistic have a history of enduring difficult situations while
maintaining a positive attitude, which provides them with the confidence that they can
withstand current negative circumstances. Similarly, a supportive environment, where
illness is not reinforced as central and where positive exchanges with respect to illness
are cultivated, establishes a context in which people can regard themselves well and
ward off negative influences. However, if a social network (or individuals within the
network) makes people conscious of the negative consequences of illness, it will likely
influence their regard for themselves with respect to illness.
The concepts of illness as central and illness as peripheral, and the associated
constructs, characterize the state of illness within the self, termed "illness self-
concept". Illness self-concept differentiates people in the same way that there is
inherent variation in any state or trait. However, illness self-concept may also change
within a person across time and situations (e.g., degree of pain or access to resources).
Some extemal factors will produce common effects for all people, for example, the
greater the social stigma of a disease, the more likely illness will be central to the self.
Conversely, the more successful a treatment is, the more likely illness will be
peripheral to the self. It is important to consider situational factors, in addition to
personal factors, when examining the relationship between illness and self.
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Using this framework, illness self-concept (i.e., the extent to which illness is
central or peripheral to the self) will be assessed. It is assumed that there are many
personal, interpersonal, and illness-related factors that influence whether an illness is
incorporated as a central or peripheral part of the self, including the parameters of the
illness and treatment, such as the disease prognosis. The current study focuses on four
factors that may be critical in influencing the relationship between illness and self:
optimism and pessimism as personal factors, social support and problematic support as
interpersonal factors, illness intrusiveness as a factor associated with the disease and
treatment, and functional status, which is used as a marker for disease severity in
fibromyalgia.
Figure 1 provides a conceptual schematic of the expected relationships
between study variables. The figure shows that there are four variables (social support,
optimism, illness intrusiveness, and functional status) that are expected to influence
illness self-concept. It also shows that illness self-concept is expected to predict
quality of life and depression, even controlling for the influence of personal,
interpersonal, and illness-related factors. The purpose of this illustration is to help the
audience visualize the hypotheses proposed in this study, and the anticipated
directions between variables, and is not intended to convey any analytical meaning.
Optimism is characterized as positive outcome expectancies and positive affect
(Scheier & Carver, 1985, 1992), and has been linked to psychological well-being
(Carver, Pozo et al., 1993), psychological adjustment (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1992),
physical well-being (Fontaine & Seal, 1997), and decreased mortality (Giltay,
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Geleijnse, Zitman, Hoekstra, Schouten, 2004). Positive outcome expectancies are the
anticipation that by engaging in certain activities, desired goals will be attained.
Optimism influences the ability to reevaluate a situation when goals are obstructed,
due to uncontrollable factors, which involves both acceptance of the current situation
and delineation of new or modified goals (Carver, Pozo et al., 1993).
The current research proposes optimism as a positive factor that influences
how illness is incorporated into the self. When illness is introduced into the life space,
optimism facilitates an acceptance of the current situation and redirects the self
towards attainable goals, activities, and relationships. Illness is more likely to be a
peripheral part ofthe self and life space. Markus and Nurius (1986) identified the
concept of expected selves, which represent expectations for the self in the future.
Carver, Reynolds & Scheier (1994) found discrepancies between optimists and
pessimists with respect to the number of expected selves, indicating that optimists
have more positive outcome expectancies for the future.
Optimism, then, is likely to positively influence the relationship between
illness and the self, such that optimists are more likely to incorporate it as peripheral.
Acceptance of an illness and positive reframing can facilitate the identification of
realistic goals, which form the basis of optimism, and result in better adjustment. For
example, patients with breast cancer who engaged in acceptance and positive
reframing showed fewer symptoms of distress post-surgery, and at three and six
months follow-up (Carver, Pozo et al., 1993). In the present research, optimism is
hypothesized to increase incorporation of illness as a peripheral part of the life space
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and self, which will result in fewer symptoms of distress (in the form of depressive
mood), and better quality of life.
Pessimism, on the other hand, is defined in terms of anticipation of poor
outcomes (Scheier & Carver, 1985) and is hypothesized to facilitate incorporation of
illness as a central part of the self (ICS). Pessimism is observed to be relatively stable
across time and context, and persons with this characteristic are described as
universally glum. Pessimism leads to giving up on objectives that are no longer
attainable and does not facilitate replacing them with new ones.
Consequently, this study hypothesizes that pessimism encourages the illness to
drive the self, its goals, activities and relationships. Without new goals and activities
many parts of the life space are pervaded by illness. Additionally, disengagement from
a goal increases self-focus (Scheier & Carver, 1985), which amplifies limitations of an
illness and illness self-consciousness. Pessimism is proposed to negatively influence
the relationship between illness and the self, such that it will be incorporated as central
to the life space.
Studies have shown that interpersonal relationships have an important impact
on adjustment in chronically illpopulations (Griffin, Friend, Kaell, & Bennett, 2001;
Hatchett, Friend, Symister, & Wadhwa, 1997; Symister & Friend, 2003). The current
study proposes that social support, as one aspect of interpersonal relationships, is
important to the extent that it either encourages a person to incorporate illness as a
central or peripheral part of the self. However, positive and negative social support are
relatively independent constructs (Symister & Friend, 2003). This suggests that
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positive social support and negative support, or problematic relationships, will have
differential effects on adjustment to chronic illness.
Research with Rheumatoid Arthritis (RA) patients has shown that positive
social support and problematic support are both related to depression (Revenson,
Schiaffino, Majerovitz & Gibofsky, 1991; Riemsma et aI., 2000) but not to each other.
Positive social support is related to fewer depressive symptoms while problematic
support is related to more depressive symptoms in patients with RA. Several other
studies have demonstrated a direct relationship between social support and mood in
RA patients (Doeglas et aI., 1994; Goodenow, Reisine, & Grady, 1990; Kraaimaat,
van Dam-Baggen, & Bijlsma, 1995). Symister and Friend found that self-esteem
partially mediated the relationship between social support and adjustment with
chronically ill patients. This indicates that social support increases self-esteem and in
turn influences adjustment. The current study proposes a similar relationship between
social support and self-concept, such that positive social support will increase positive
self-concept, and illness will likely be incorporated as peripheral to the self (IPS).
On the other hand, problematic support is proposed to negatively influence
self-concept and illness is more likely to be incorporated as central to the self (ICS).
Problematic relationships exist when important people (family and/or friends) do not
understand the nature of an illness, its treatment, symptoms and subsequent limitations
(Bediako & Friend, 2004; Hatchett, et aI., 1997; Revenson et aI., 1991; Riemsma et
al., 2000; Symister & Friend, 2003). When individuals with chronic illness do not feel
that important others understand what they are going through, the illness self is
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reinforced. Those who receive problematic support are more likely to integrate illness
as central to their self-concept.
Hatchett et al. (1997) found direct support for the relationship between
family's lack of knowledge about disease characteristics and adjustment to illness in a
prospective study with renal patients. More specifically, they found that problematic
support (including excessive family expectations and feeling misunderstood) predicted
depression, hopelessness, illness intrusiveness and quality oflife. Controlling for
negative affect, Symister and Friend (2003) found that self-esteem significantly
reduced the relationship between problematic support and depression. This suggests
that problematic relations decrease self-esteem, which in tum influences depression.
Similarly, the current research proposes that problematic support will negatively
influence self-concept, such that illness will more likely be central to the self.
The parameters of a chronic illness, for example the progression of the disease,
are likely to influence the course of the illness and how the self responds (Griffin,
Friend, Kaell, Bennett, & Wadhwa, 1999). This research identifies illness
intrusiveness as a factor that represents the extent to which an illness disrupts valued
activities and life domains, and examines its relationship to self-concept. Following
Devins and colleagues (Beanlands et al., 2003; Devins, Beanlands, Mandin, & Paul,
1997), the study proposes that when illness intrusiveness is minimal, illness is more
likely to be peripheral to the self. However, as illness intrusiveness increases, illness is
more likely to be central to the self.
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Fibromyalgia affects individuals' physical functioning and abilities, work
status, sleep, pain, stiffuess, fatigue, anxiety, and well-being. Unlike other chronic
illnesses, there are no biological markers that can be used to identify the severity of an
individual's condition. Physicians and researchers use a measure of functional status,
which stands as a measure of disease severity. As functional status decreases (and
physical impairment and symptoms increase), illness is likely to pervade many regions
of the life space and illness self-consciousness will increase. Consequently, the poorer
the functional status, the more likely illness will be central to the self. However, when
functional status is good, and physical impairment and symptoms are minimal, illness
is likely to pervade few regions of the life space, and illness self-consciousness will be
low. Consequently, the better the functional status, the more likely illness will be
peripheral to the self.
The current research tested this framework (see Figure I) on patients with
fibromyalgia syndrome (FMS). Fibromyalgia is a chronic disorder characterized by
widespread musculoskeletal pain and tenderness in specific areas of the body (tender
points). Symptoms offibromyalgia include headaches, sleep disturbance, fatigue,
morning stiffuess, and irritable bowel syndrome (Bennett, 2002; Wolfe, Smythe,
Yunus, Bennett, Bombardier, Goldenberg, et aI., 1990). Although there is now
substantial evidence that fibromyalgia is a disorder of the central nervous system and
has an established pathogenesis (Bennett, 2004; Inanici & Yunus, 2004), fibromyalgia
is sometimes not recognized as a legitimate diagnosis (Bennett, 2002). As a result,
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these patients may be more vulnerable to stigma and psychological distress, compared
to a population with a less contested diagnosis.
FMS is difficult to successfully treat (Wolfe, Anderson, Harkness, Bennett,
Caro, Goldenberg, et aI., 1997), and studies have suggested that treatment should
focus on both physical and emotional functioning (Bennett, 2002; Thieme, Turk, &
Flor, 2004). Wolfe et al. examined outcomes for 538 patients across six U.S.
rheumatology centers and found no substantial change over time with respect to pain,
functional disability, fatigue, sleep disturbance, or psychological status. As a result, it
is essential to examine treatment alternatives for fibromyalgia patients, specifically
seeking ways to improve quality of life and functional status. The current research
attempts to define the relationship between illness self-concept and adjustment in an
effort to improve the quality oflife for patients with fibromyalgia and other chronic
conditions.
The present study goes beyond previous research in attempting to describe the
specific relationship between illness and the self. The main purpose of the study was
to generate and assess constructs that characterize the state of illness within the self,
using a newly developed tool which measures illness self-concept, and to examine its
relationship to adjustment in fibromyalgia. A second purpose was to identify personal,
interpersonal, and illness-related factors that help to determine illness self-concept.
The following hypotheses were proposed:
I. Illness self-concept is related to adjustment, such that the more
illness is perceived as a peripheral part of the self (IPS), the greater
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the quality of life and the lower the depressive mood. Conversely,
the more illness is perceived as central to the self (ICS), the poorer
the quality oflife and the greater the depressive mood.
2. Personal, interpersonal, and illness-related factors influence illness
self-concept, such that the more optimism and social support, the
lower the illness intrusiveness and the better the functional status, the
more likely that illness will be incorporated as peripheral to the self.
In contrast, the more pessimism and problematic support, the higher
the illness intrusiveness and the worse the functional status, the more
likely that illness will be incorporated as central to the self.
3. Illness self-concept will predict quality oflife and depressive mood
over and above the impact of any of the following taken alone:
optimism, social support, illness intrusiveness, and functional status.
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Method
Sample
Data were collected from 109 subjects with fibromyalgia, recruited from the
Oregon Fibromyalgia Foundation's online volunteer database. To be eligible for the
study, participants had to have a primary diagnosis of fibromyalgia. Demographic
characteristics of the participants are shown in Table I. The mean length of diagnosis
was 9.7 years (SO = 7.45). Participants ranged in age from 16 to 77 years, with a mean
age of 53 (SO = 10). The sample was predominantly white (97%) and most had at
least some college education (83%). Ninety-five percent of the sample were women
and 5% were men. Sixty-three percent of the sample were married, versus 37% who
were not, and 37% were currently working, versus 63% who were not. Forty-two
percent of the sample reported that they stopped working because they were ill.
Procedure
Two hundred people with fibromyalgia were randomly selected from a
database of over 300 people, maintained by the Oregon Fibromyalgia Foundation.
The foundation is a volunteer, non-profit organization that provides information about
fibromyalgia online and encourages fibromyalgia-related research. The foundation
maintains a database of people with fibromyalgia who have volunteered to participate
in research. Subjects were identified through the database and asked to participate via
mail. A questionnaire, accompanied by a letter explaining the purpose of the research
and what participation entails, was mailed to each potential participant. Participants
18
were asked to complete the written questionnaire and return it in the provided
stamped, return envelope.
Three weeks after the questionnaires were sent to participants, a reminder
postcard was sent to participants who had not yet responded. If, after the second letter,
there was still no response, participants were telephoned to ask for their participation.
If they were uninterested, they were asked to return the questionnaire in the pre-paid
envelope. Of the two hundred questionnaires that were sent out, 171 subjects received
the questionnaire or were eligible to participate (i.e., had a primary diagnosis of
fibromyalgia). One hundred and nine subjects returned the completed questionnaire,
with a total response rate of 64%. Sixteen subjects (9%) refused to participate and
another 27% did not respond at all to the questionnaire.
Measures
Independent Variables
Illness Self-Concept. The Illness Self-Concept Scale was developed for the
purpose of this study. Twenty-three items were used to assess the extent to which a
participant's illness permeates the self-concept (i.e., is as a central or peripheral part of
their self-concept). Items assessed the centrality of illness using three constructs:
directionality, pervasiveness, and self-consciousness. Directionality indicates whether
illness occupies a central region of the life space and, thus, is a driving force, or
whether the pre-illness self has been preserved. An example of an item from this
construct is, "My illness is at the center of who I am". Pervasiveness indicates the
extent to which illness has pervaded important and valued regions of the life space. An
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example of an item measuring pervasiveness is, "1 do not allow my illness to affect too
many parts of my life". Illness self-consciousness refers to the extent that a person is
focused on their illness and how much time they spend thinking about their illness. An
example of an illness self-consciousness item is, "1 am preoccupied with my illness".
Some items assess more than one construct. For example, "Sometimes I feel
consumed by my illness" illustrates that illness is a driving force, that many or all
regions of the life space are "consumed" or pervaded, and implies a preoccupation
with illness (self-consciousness). Thirteen items measure directionality, seven measure
pervasiveness, and three measure illness self-consciousness. Participants rated their
level of agreement with each item on a six point scale from "Strongly disagree" (1) to
"Strongly agree" (6). Negative items were reverse scored and higher scores indicate
that illness is more central to the self-concept. A reliability analysis was conducted
and the illness self-concept scale demonstrated high internal consistency (a = .94).
Item analysis and further psychometric characteristics are described in the results
section since the scale was developed for the purposes of this study.
Items for the Illness Self-Concept Scale were derived from the theory
developed in this research, which claims that the relationship between illness and the
self can be described in terms of occupying central and peripheral regions of the self
and life space, and through three subsidiary constructs. Items that reflect illness as a
central or peripheral region of the self-concept and life space were generated. In
addition, items addressing the pervasive aspects of illness and the extent to which a
person is preoccupied with their illness were generated. A meeting was conducted
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with a woman who suffers from Rheumatoid Arthritis. She gave feedback as to which
items were worded awkwardly, which reflected experiences that she has had, and
provided insight as to other experiences which reflect illness self-concept. Items were
eliminated or modified in order to measure illness self-concept, as developed in this
study, and to address actual experiences of people with chronic illness.
After the items were revised, they were pilot-tested with approximately ten
people that had chronic conditions, varying from chronic back pain to pulmonary
disease. The interviews took place as a student project, required for participation in the
Advanced Applied Developmental Psychology graduate seminar in Winter 200S.This
process was especially useful as the items were pilot-tested in an interview format,
which allowed participants to provide verbal feedback regarding item interpretation
and how items could be changed to be more effective. In addition, some items were
identified as more relevant than others. This process validated which items were
measuring the intended underlying constructs and additional items addressing these
constructs were generated to create the final scale.
Illness Self-Concept Support (ISC Support). The ISC Support Scale was
developed for the purpose ofthis study and assesses the extent to which a participant's
social support network reinforces illness as central or peripheral to their self-concept.
The scale contains items that measure positive support, where illness is reinforced as a
peripheral part of the self-concept, and items that measure negative support, where
illness is reinforced as central. The intimate social network referenced in the scale is
defined as partner or spouse, family, and close friends. Fourteen items focus on the
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three constructs proposed to facilitate the relationship between illness and the self:
directionality, pervasiveness, and illness self-consciousness. Six items measure
directionality, three measure pervasiveness, and five measure illness self-
consciousness, with some items addressing more than one construct. For example,
"Reminds me that my illness does not define me", assesses both directionality and
illness self-consciousness.
Participants rated their level of agreement with each item on a six point scale
from "Strongly disagree" (I) to "Strongly agree" (6). Negative items were reverse
scored with higher scores indicating that a participant's social support network
reinforces illness as a central part of the self-concept. A reliability analysis was
conducted and the ISC Support Scale demonstrated high internal consistency (a =
.89). Item analysis and further psychometric characteristics of the scale are discussed
in the results section.
The three sub-constructs measured by the ISC Support Scale are the same
constructs assessed in the self using the Illness Self-Concept Scale. In developing the
Illness Self-Concept Scale, more items fell under the directionality construct, since the
primary component of illness self-concept is whether illness occupies a central part of
the self-concept and life space and, thus, directs the self. Pervasiveness and illness
self-consciousness are also measured, but are subsidiary constructs that help to further
describe how illness is either central or peripheral. The ISC Support Scale intends to
measure how a social network reinforces illness as central or peripheral. The nature of
social interactions is such that people may influence the self through verbal and
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behavioral exchanges. The constructs of pervasiveness and illness self-consciousness
lend themselves to these exchanges. For example, an individual in a social network
may remind someone of their illness (illness self-consciousness), or suggest an activity
that expands the life space (pervasiveness). Because these two constructs are more
prevalent in social exchanges, there are more items (proportionally) that fall under
these two constructs in the ISC Support Scale than in the Illness Self-Concept Scale.
Illness Intrusiveness. In order to measure illness intrusiveness, the Illness
Intrusiveness Rating Scale was employed (Devins, Yitzchak, et al., 1983). The Illness
Intrusiveness Rating Scale (IIRS) is a 13-item self-report measure that assesses the
extent to which a disease and/or its treatment interfere with 13 life domains, including
health, diet, work, financial situation, active recreation, passive recreation, relationship
with partner, sex life, family relations, other social relations, self-expression/self-
improvement, religious expression, and community and civic activities. Respondents
rate intrusiveness along a 7-point scale from "Not Very Much" to "Very Much". Prior
studies demonstrate construct validity of the scale, and internal consistency across
illness groups (alpha = .85) and within Rheumatoid Arthritis patients (alpha = .90)
(Devins, Edworthy, Seland et al., 1993). Internal consistency for this scale in the
current study is alpha = .87, showing reliability consistent with other chronically ill
populations.
Fibromyalgia Impact Questionnaire (FIQ). In order to measure functional
status in fibromyalgia, the Fibromyalgia Impact Questionnaire was employed
(Burckhardt, Clark, & Bennett, 1991). The Fibromyalgia Impact Questionnaire (FIQ)
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measures patient functional status by evaluating physical dysfunction and impairment.
The FIQ contains items that assess physical, psychological, social, and global well
being. Ten items form the physical functioning scale, which addresses a patient's
ability to do large muscle tasks (e.g., shopping, laundry, preparing meals). Two items
ask how many days a patient felt good during the previous week, and how many days
they missed work due to their illness. Seven additional items assess the severity of
specific symptoms over the last week, including difficulty with work, pain, fatigue,
waking rested, stiffuess, anxiety, and feelings of depression. Prior to analysis, items
assessing anxiety and depression were eliminated to avoid confounding functional
status with depression. The FIQ has shown internal consistency (alpha = .79) (Oliver
& Cronan, 2005), and has demonstrated test-retest reliability (0.56 to 0.95), over six
one-week intervals, and construct validity (Burckhardt, et aI., 1991). The internal
reliability for the FIQ in the current study is alpha = .90.
OptimismlPessimism. In order to measure optimism, the Life Orientation Test-
Revised was employed (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). The Life Orientation Test-
Revised is a 10-item scale used to measure optimism and pessimism. The scale
contains three questions measuring optimism (positive outcomes), three measuring
pessimism (negative outcomes), and four filler questions. Negative items were
reverse-scored and added to the overall optimism scale, with high scores on the scale
indicating greater optimism and low scores indicating greater pessimism. The LOT-R
shows internal consistency (a = .71) and test-retest reliability of.45 (separated by
three months) with chronic kidney patients (Symister & Friend, 2003). In the current
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study using fibromyalgia patients, the internal consistency for the LOT-R is alpha =
.89.
Social Desirability. In order to measure social desirability a short form of the
Marlowe-Crown Social Desirability Scale was employed (Reynolds, 1982). The
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was included
in order to identify participants' tendency to respond in culturally appropriate ways. It
is a 13-item scale that is controlled for in the study analyses. The short form has been
shown to be a viable alternative to the full scale (Zook & Sipps, 1985).
Dependent Variables
Quality of Life. In order to measure global quality oflife, four items reviewed
and suggested by Campbell, Converse, and Rodgers (1976) were used. The first two
items, "1 generally feel in good spirits", and "I find a good deal of happiness in life",
measure a degree of optimism and an individual's overall happiness (Bachman, Kahn,
Davidson, and Johnston, 1967). A third item measures how satisfied an individual is
with their current life, and the fourth asks for an overall rating or evaluation of their
current life (Cantril, 1965). All four items have shown a Cronbach's alpha of .74 and a
test-retest correlation (approximately three months apart) of .76 in patients with
chronic renal disease (Hatchett et aI., 1997). In the current study, the internal
consistency for these items is alpha = .88.
Depressive Symptoms. The Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward,
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) was used to assess depression as a measure of
adjustment. Items that assess common symptoms of fibromyalgia (effort, fatigue, and
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poor sleep) were eliminated as they are highly endorsed by people with fibromyalgia.
The remaining items were scored to obtain a measure of cognitive depression.
Respondents answer items on a 4-point scale where 0 represents the absence of a
problem and 3 represents an extreme problem. This scale has shown internal
consistency (a = .85), and a test-retest correlation of .73 in chronically ill populations,
when assessed approximately three months apart (Hatchett, L., Friend, R., Symister,
P., &Wadhwa, N., 1997). The internal consistency for this scale in the current study is
similar to that in other chronically ill populations (a = .87).
Control Variables
After the three study hypotheses were tested, additional analyses were
conducted to further specify illness self-concept as a new construct. The hierarchical
regression analyses utilized control for several variables, which are described below.
Control Over Pain & Fatigue. In order to measure participants' perceptions of
control over pain and fatigue (two primary symptoms of fibromyagia), two items were
added to the Fibromyalgia Impact Questionnaire (FIQ). The items asked, "How much
control do you have over your pain/fatigue", and respondents answered on a visual
analog scale from 1 (no control) to 10 (a lot of control). These items are not part of the
FIQ and were added specifically to measure (and control for) participants perceptions
of control.
Self-Esteem. In order to measure self-esteem, and to demonstrate that illness
self-concept is a construct apart from self-esteem, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale
(Rosenberg, 1979) was employed. This scale has ten items, five addressing negative
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perceptions of self, and five addressing positive perceptions of self. Higher scores
indicate higher self-esteem. Previous research had demonstrated high internal
consistency for this scale (a = .87) (Rosenberg, 1979).
Victimization. In order to measure victimization, one item was added to the
Fibromyalgia Impact Questionnaire (FIQ). The items asked, "How victimized do you
feel by your illness", and respondents answered on a IO-point visual analog scale from
I (not victimized) to 10 (very victimized). This item is not part of the FIQ and was
added to measure the extent to which participants feel victimized by their illness. It
was thought that this was an important variable to assess in fibromyalgia patients who
may feel victimized as a result of the stigma attached to the diagnosis, and because
some physicians do not validate fibromyalgia as a legitimate condition. This item was
included to demonstrate that it is sufficiently related to illness self-concept, but is not
synonymous with illness self-concept.
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Results
Results for the current study are presented in two sections. The first section
consists of scale construction and psychometrics for the Illness Self-Concept and ISC
Support scales. The second section begins with a description of the relationships
between study and demographic variables, followed by a presentation of results for the
three study hypotheses, and concludes with additional analyses which were conducted
to further evaluate the hypotheses and illness self-concept.
Psychometric Properties of the Illness Self-Concept and ISC Support Scales
Illness Self-Concept Scale
Item-total correlations for the overall scale were examined (Table 1), with an
average item-total correlation of .63, and a range of .52 to .80. Several items correlated
very highly with the total score, indicating that these items are most representative of
the concept underlying the scale. These items include item eight, "I feel consumed by
my illness" (r = .78), item seven, "1 do not allow my illness to affect too many parts of
my life" (r = .74), item 23, "My illness dictates nearly everything 1do" (r = .80), and
item two, "I am preoccupied with my illness" (r = .73). Each item was also
significantly and positively correlated with each other.
A box and whisker plot displaying the distribution of each of the 23 items in
the Illness Self-Concept scale was examined to determine which items contributed
variance to the total score (Figure 2). Examination of the box-whisker plot revealed
that the mean and standard deviations varied among items. The variation in mean
scores for each item demonstrates that participants endorsed each item differently. The
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variation in standard deviations demonstrates that there is more variation is some
items than others. This suggests that each item contributed to the overall variance of
the scale. The mean for the first item in the scale is higher than all other item means,
reflecting that it was endorsed strongly by participants. This item, "My illness is with
me most of the time", is a fairly neutral item that was intentionally situated as the first
item in order to ease participants into the scale, since some items are fairly poignant
(e.g., "I am dominated by my illness").
Thirteen items of the Illness Self-Concept scale were worded in such a way
that, if endorsed, subjects were reporting illness as central to their self-concept (see
Table 2). For example, if a subject positively endorsed the item, "My illness is at the
center of who I am", they are agreeing that illness is at least somewhat central to their
self-concept. Ten items were worded in such a way that, if endorsed, subjects were
reporting that they are able to preserve their sense of self and life space in spite of
illness (See Table 3). For example, if a subject positively endorsed the item, "I do
many of the same things as healthy others, despite my illness", they are agreeing that
they are able to preserve a sense of non-illness self.
Items that were worded in the same way were summed to create two subscales.
One subscale represents items that reflect illness as central to the self (Table 2) and
one represents items that reflect illness as peripheral to the self (Table 3). The two
subscales were formed specifically for analyzing whether or not items worded in one
direction had a greater influence on participants' responses. These subscales are not
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conceptual or substantive in nature, and were only used to examine the impact, if any,
of item wording.
Means and standard deviations for the two subscales are shown in Tables 2 and
3. The mean for the scale with items worded to reflect illness as central to the self is
significantly higher than for the subscale that reflects an ability to preserve the self (M
= 3.69, SD = 1.07 and M = 3.11, SD = 1.03, respectively). A paired sample t-test
confirms this, t = 7.86, p<.OOI. This suggest that participants endorsed items that
reflect illness as central slightly more strongly than items that reflect an ability to
preserve the self.
The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale provided a measure of the
likelihood that participants will respond in culturally appropriate or socially expected
ways, rather than responding accurately to study questions. Correlations between each
item in the Illness Self-Concept Scale and individual scores on the social desirability
scale were examined to determine if items should be eliminated due to biases in how
participants responded. Theses correlations are shown in Table I. Although some
items correlated with social desirability scores, no item correlated more highly with
social desirability than with the overall Illness Self-Concept Scale. This analysis
provided further confirmation that all items in the Illness Self-Concept Scale should be
retained in the study analyses.
The above item analyses provided statistical evidence that all items in the
Illness Self-Concept Scale should be retained. Although fewer items are less
cumbersome for participants, reducing the number of items may diminish reliability.
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At this stage of development, all items will be retained. It should be noted, however,
that there are theoretical reasons to retain all items. We strongly suspect that illness
self-concept will vary across chronically ill populations and, specifically, that mean
scores on individual items in the scale may vary according to symptoms, treatment and
other parameters of an illness. There is added value in examining illness self-concept
mean scores across chronically ill populations in order to determine if some illnesses
are more prone to consuming its sufferers. As such, all items should be retained until
the scale is tested in other populations so that distributions, means, variances and other
psychometric properties can be accurately compared across illnesses.
The three theoreticallllness Self-Concept subscales were correlated with each
other, and with the overall scale (subscale items, item means, and standard deviations
are shown in Table 4). The directionality and pervasiveness subscales were correlated
at .79, the directionality and illness self-consciousness were correlated at .73, and the
pervasiveness and illness self-consciousness subscales were correlated at .63. All three
subscales correlated with the overall Illness Self-Concept Scale (directionality, r = .97,
pervasiveness, r = .90, and illness self-consciousness, r = .80) and with the main study
variables (see Table 5). It should be noted that the correlations between the sub-
constructs and the overall scale are inflated because the total scale included each sub-
construct. The correlations between the subscales and the total scale confirm that the
directionality subscale was the most conceptually similar to the overall scale. This
makes sense as the directionality subscale intended to measure how central or
peripheral illness is to the self-concept.
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The correlations between the subscales were squared to calculate the percent of
common variance shared by each pair of subscales, and demonstrates that
pervasiveness and illness self-consciousness measure something somewhat different
than the central or peripheral position of illness within the self. The directionality and
pervasiveness subscales share 63% common variance, indicating that the scales are not
synonymous. The directionality and illness self-consciousness share 53% common
variance, indicating that although some variance is shared, they measure something
different. The pervasiveness and illness self-consciousness subscales share 40%
variance, indicating that theses two subscales are not measuring the exact same thing.
The squared correlations provide evidence that each subscale measures
something different and that each should be retained in order to achieve a
comprehensive conceptualization of illness self-concept. Pervasiveness intends to
measure how pervasive illness is in terms of time and space. This subscale measures
how much of the life space is taken over by illness, and how often illness permeates
the life space. lIIness self-consciousness intends to measure the extent to which a
person is preoccupied with their illness (i.e., thinks about their illness). Each ofthese
subscales and subsidiary constructs are important in understanding what factors
contribute to the overall position of illness within the self, and can be important tools
in understanding how to minimize illness or preserve the self.
The psychometric properties ofthe total Illness Self-Concept Scale were
examined to determine the overall distribution of the scale and the extent of variation
within the scale. Figure 3 presents a histogram revealing that the scale is normally
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distributed with a total mean of79.04 (SD = 22.53) and a mean item score of3.44 (on
a scale from one to six, SD = .98). By comparing the possible range (23-138) with the
observed range (23-130), it is clear that individuals within the study sample range over
the whole scale and extend to both ends of the scale. The low end of the scale
represents individuals who were able to preserve their sense of self in spite of illness.
The high end of the scale represents individuals who are consumed by illness, and
whose illness is central to the self-concept.
The mean for the total scale (M = 79.04 , SD = 22.53) is approximately in the
center of the distribution. This demonstrates that the average individual is consumed to
some extent by their illness. The observed range and the standard deviation
demonstrate sufficient variability within the study population with respect to illness
self-concept. Responses to the Illness Self-Concept Scale were on a six-point scale,
from I ("strongly disagree") to 6 ("strongly agree"). The mean item score using the
six-point scale was 3.44 (SD = .98), reinforcing that scores for illness self-concept
items are approximately at the mean. Cronbach's alpha for the scale was .94,
demonstrating high internal consistency.
Summary
All items correlate with the total scale and the means vary such that each item
contributes to the overall score of illness self-concept. The three conceptual subscales,
while correlated, measure unique aspects of illness self-concept and provide further
information regarding the position of illness within the self. The Illness Self-Concept
Scale is normally distributed with some subjects reporting that they are consumed by
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illness and others reporting that they are able to preserve their sense of self in spite of
illness. The scale demonstrated high internal consistency (a = .94).
Illness Self Concept Support Scale (ISC Support Scale)
The purpose of the ISC Support Scale was to measure the extent to which a
participant's social support network (i.e., partner, family, close friends) reinforce
illness as central or peripheral to the self and life space. The scale used 14 items to
examine illness self-concept support with items addressing the three theoretical sub-
constructs: directionality, pervasiveness, and illness self-consciousness. Items were
worded positively to represent a social network that reinforces illness as central, and
negatively to represent a social network that reinforces illness as peripheral. Subjects
were asked to respond to the scale items from I ("strongly disagree") to 6 ("strongly
agree"). The study examined the psychometric properties of this scale using the same
analyses as those used in analyzing the Illness Self-Concept Scale.
Item-total correlations for the overall scale are shown in Table 6. Each item
was substantially correlated with the total scale (ranging from r = .38 to r = .71). The
average item-total correlation for the ISC Support Scale is .57. The three items that
correlated most highly with the total scale were, item number four, "Makes me feel
that I am a capable person", item number six, "Makes it seem as though my illness
runs my life", and item number eleven, "Undermines my confidence in myself and
what I can do".
A box and whisker plot examining the distribution of all items in the ISC
Support Scale (Figure 4) demonstrates that individual items each contributed variance
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to the overall scale. The mean response across items showed less variation than in the
Illness Self-Concept Scale, but still demonstrated sufficient variability. Mean
responses to the majority of items fell between 2 and 3, on a six-point scale. However,
because items were worded in two different ways (i.e., to represent illness reinforced
as central or peripheral), there is evidence that respondents were not simply answering
questions systematically, but were taking the time to read and evaluate each item. The
standard deviations varied sufficiently across items (although not as substantially as
with the Illness Self-Concept Scale), demonstrating that each item contributed
variance to the overall scale. The standard deviations provide information as to which
items contributed more variance to the overall scale, and which items elicited similar
responses from the majority of subjects. For example, item three (Table 6),
"Sometimes makes me conscious of my physical limitations", varied considerably,
indicating that respondents both agreed and disagreed that this was true of their social
support network. Other items, for example number 11, "Undermines my confidence in
myself and what 1can do", and number four, "Makes me feel I am a capable person",
had relatively less variation, demonstrating that the majority of subjects answered
these items more similarly.
Seven items of the ISC Support Scale were worded in such a way that, if
endorsed, subjects were reporting a social support network that reinforces illness as
central to their self-concept. For example, if a subject positively endorsed, "Makes it
seem as though my illness runs my life", they are agreeing that their network
reinforces illness as at least somewhat central to their self-concept and life space.
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Seven items were worded in such a way that, if endorsed, subjects were reporting that
their network reinforced illness as a peripheral part of the self and life space. For
example, if a subject positively endorsed, "Reminds me that my illness does not define
me", they are agreeing that their social network tries to preserve a sense of non-illness
self.
Items that were worded in the same way were summed to create two subscales.
Theses subscales were created solely to evaluate the impact of item wording on
participant responses and are not substantive in nature. The mean for the subscale that
endorsed a social network that reinforces illness as central was 2.42 (SD = .96). The
mean for the subscale that endorsed a social network that supports illness as peripheral
to the self was 2.56 (SD = .89). The means for the two subscales were not significantly
different (t = -1.35, P = .18), indicating that participants endorsed items worded both
ways.
Table 6 shows how each item correlates with social desirability. Two items
correlated significantly with social desirability: number three, "Sometimes makes me
conscious of my physical limitations" (r = -.34, p<.OI), and number 13, "Sometimes
views me as a 'sick' person in a way that makes me feel helpless" (r = -.20, p<.05).
The correlation between these items and social desirability indicates that subjects were
somewhat biased in their responses such that the more conscious a participant was of
social expectations, the less likely they were to endorse that item.
However, since other items such as number 12, "Makes me feel I cannot do
much now that I am ill", and number six, "Makes it seem as though my illness runs
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my life", were both highly correlated with the total and did not correlate with social
desirability, the issue may be in the specific wording of the item. For example, it may
be that "views me as a sick person in a way that makes me feel helpless" is worded too
strongly. Or, the relationship of this item to social desirability could mean that
participants have difficulty with the idea of being perceived as helpless, and thus do
not want to endorse the item. Importantly, no items correlated more highly with social
desirability than with the overalllSC Support Scale. As a result, all items were
retained in the study analyses.
The three ISC Support subscales were correlated with each other, and with the
overall scale (subscale items, item means, and standard deviations are shown in Table
7). The directionality and pervasiveness subscales were correlated at .66, the
directionality and illness self-consciousness were correlated at .58, and the
pervasiveness and illness self-consciousness subscales were correlated at .72. The
correlations between the subscales were squared to determine the amount of variance
shared by each pair of subscales. The directionality and pervasiveness subscale share
44% of common variance, the directionality and illness self-consciousness subscales
share 32% common variance, and the pervasiveness and illness self-consciousness
subscales share 52% common variance. The squared correlations demonstrate that
although the subscales measure shared aspects of ISC support, the subsca1es are not
synonymous and each subscale measures something different.
All three subscales correlated with the overall ISC Support Scale
(directionality, r = .90, pervasiveness, r = .86, and illness self-consciousness, r = .86)
37
and with the main study variables (see Table 8). It should be remembered that these
correlations are inflated because the overall scale includes each of the subscales. The
magnitude of the correlations between the subscales and the overall scale demonstrate
that each contributes similarly to the overall scale. That is, the three subscales of the
ISC Support Scale are equally important in defining how the social support network
reinforces illness as either central or peripheral.
A social support network can reinforce illness as central by insinuating that
"illness runs their life" (directionality), by "undermining their confidence in what they
can do" (pervasiveness), and by "making them conscious oftheir physical limitations"
(illness self-consciousness). The pervasiveness subscale identifies how social
networks help find ways to minimize illness, or they can make it seem as though all
aspects of a person's life are influenced by illness. The illness self-consciousness
subscale characterizes ways that a social network can minimize preoccupation with
illness or make illness more cognitively salient. Each subscale provides information as
to how a network either minimizes or reinforces illness.
A histogram was drawn to examine the overall distribution of the total ISC
Support Scale. Examination of the histogram (Figure 5) yields a scale that is normally
distributed in the study sample. The mean for the total scale is 34.78 (SD = 10.97),
which is slightly positively skewed. Possible scores on the scale ranged from 14-84
with observed scores ranging from 14-68. The range of observed scores indicates that
while some participants report that their network reinforces illness as peripheral,
others report that their social network reinforces illness as central to the self-concept.
38
The item mean for the scale is 2.48 (SD = 0.78) with a possible range from one to six,
reinforcing that responses to most items were positively skewed. This demonstrates
that subjects reported that their social support network reinforced illness as more
peripheral than central to the self.
Summary
All items correlated with the total scale and with each other, and each
contributed to the overall variance of the scale. The three subscales measured both
similar and distinct aspects of ISC support and provide further information as to how
social networks reinforced illness as either central or peripheral to participants.
Overall, the ISC Support Scale achieved high internal consistency (a = .88), and
displayed a normal distribution in the study population, with participants ranging from
low ISC support to high ISC support.
Whereas the Illness Self-Concept Scale's main purpose was to establish the
position of illness within the self, the ISC Support Scale aimed to measure the extent
to which family and friends influence the position of illness within the self. Examining
item box-whisker plots for each scale reveals that the means for ISC Support items do
not vary as much as items making up the Illness Self-Concept Scale. The observed
range for the ISC Support Scale was not as large as for the Illness Self-Concept Scale.
As mentioned previously, it may be that participants were more comfortable
answering questions regarding their own self-concept, and less comfortable answering
questions that suggest that their social support networks may not always be supportive.
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The correlation between the Illness Self-Concept and ISC Support scales is r =
.55 (p<.Ol), indicating a positive relationship between the two variables, such that the
more illness is reinforced as central by a social network, the more likely illness is a
central part of the self-concept. The relationship between these two variables will be
discussed further when the results of hypothesis two are presented. The importance of
the positive and significant relationship between the two scales is that it provides
construct validity for each scale. Ifboth scales measure what they intend to measure, a
moderate to strong, positive correlation is expected and is, in fact, demonstrated.
Tests of Study Hypotheses
This section begins by examining which demographic variables are related to
study variables in order to determine which need to be controlled for when testing the
study hypotheses. Next, the relationships between the study variables will be presented
briefly, followed by tests of each of the study hypotheses. Lastly, additional analyses,
which were included to further evaluate illness self-concept and describe its
relationship to other variables known to be important in chronic illness, are presented.
Relationships Between Study and Demographic Variables
Table 9 presents the correlations between study variables and demographic
variables. Education, marital status, employment status, and whether participants
stopped working because they were ill correlated significantly with one or more of the
study variables. Education correlated significantly with several study variables, such
that the greater the participant's education, the greater quality oflife (r = .25), the less
depression (r = -.31), the less central their illness self-concept (r = -.28), the less their
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social support network reinforced illness as central (r = -.26), the greater their
optimism (r = .26), and the better their functional status (r = -.28). Marital status was
significantly associated with study variables, such that participants who were married
reported better quality of life (r = -.32), less depression (r = .25), and better functional
status (r = .21). Employment status was significantly associated with one independent
variable, such that those who were not employed had poorer functional status (r = .33).
Lastly, whether participants stopped working because they were ill correlated
significantly with several study variables, such that those who had to stop working
reported lower quality oflife (r = .23), more depression (r = -.23), higher illness self-
concept scores (r = -.31), a social network that reinforced illness as central (r = -.24),
greater illness intrusiveness (r = -.34), and poorer functional health status (r = -.31).
Subsequently, these variables were controlled for in analyses in which they correlate
significantly with an independent or dependent study variable.
Several variables did not correlate significantly with any of the study variables.
Age of study participants and length of diagnosis did not correlate significantly, and
ethnicity related only to depression (r = .25, p<.OI). It is notable that age and length of
diagnosis were not related to illness self-concept. Presumably, the older participants
are and the more time they have had to adjust to their diagnosis, the less likely illness
would be central to the self-concept. The fact that this relationship was not found
suggests that illness self-concept is not simply a phenomenon that occurs at the onset
of a diagnosis, but remains an important factor throughout the course of chronic
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illness. The correlation between ethnicity and depression should be considered
cautiously as there were only three study participants who were not Caucasian.
Interestingly, gender was associated with each of the study variables except for
optimism. Being male gender was associated with poorer functional status (r = .19,
p<.05), poorer ISC support (r = .22, p<.05), worse illness self-concept (r = .23, p<.05),
more illness intrusiveness (r = .29, p<.Ol), greater depression (r = .22, P <.05), and
poorer quality oflife (r = -.27, p<.Ol). There were only five males in the sample, so
results should be considered with caution. However, fibromyalgia is often stereo-typed
as a predominantly "female" disorder. As such, it may be more difficult for men who
have fibromyalgia to come to terms with their diagnosis, resulting in poorer
psychological outcomes.
In addition, social desirability was correlated with study variables. Social
desirability measures the extent to which a participant is likely to provide answers that
are socially desirable or acceptable and which are not necessarily a true representation
of where they stand on a particular study variable. Accordingly, where social
desirability was associated with either an independent or dependent variable, it was
controlled for in Step 1 of subsequent analyses. Social desirability significantly
correlated with illness self-concept (r = -.28, p<.Ol), such that the greater the social
desirability, the more illness was reported as peripheral to the self. This relationship is
in accordance with what is expected. A subject who is conscious of socially
appropriate responses is more likely to downplay the extent to which illness has come
to consume their self-concept and life space.
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Similarly, those who report more bias towards socially appropriate responses
are more likely to report an optimistic outlook on life. The relationship between social
desirability and optimism is r = .33 (p<.Ol). The correlation between illness
intrusiveness and social desirability is r = -.24 (p<.05), indicating that subjects who
scored higher on social desirability reported illness as less intrusive than other
subjects. Likewise, the correlation between depression and social desirability is r = -
.39 (p<.Ol), such that the greater the social desirability, the lower the reported
depression scores. Lastly, the relationship between quality of life and social
desirability was r = .29 (p<.Ol), such that the greater the social desirability scores, the
better the reported quality oflife.
Summary
In summary, the demographic variables which correlated with several study
variables include education, marital status, stopped work due to illness, and social
desirability. Education is a difficult variable to disentangle because it encompasses
aspects of family educational background and current socioeconomic status, as well as
the objective level of education achieved. Marital status correlated with functional
status, which may be due to the fact that those who were married had more help with
household chores and tasks. Much of the FIQ (measure of functional status) is based
on the ability to carryout routine household tasks. Marital status was also related to
depression and quality of life and, as is shown in subsequent analyses, remains a
strong predictor of quality oflife. This suggests, in general, that those who are married
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report a better quality of life. Lastly, whether subjects stopped work because of illness
correlated with each study variable with the exception of optimism.
There are several explanations for these correlations. With respect to functional
status, it may be that having to stop work is a marker for the severity of disease. The
correlation between stopped work and illness intrusiveness may be explained by the
overlap in constructs, such that illness intrusiveness specifically asks about intrusion
in the work domain. It is not surprising that having to stop work because of illness
would be associated with increases in depression, decreases in quality oflife, and that
illness would occupy a more central region of the self-concept. Much of our identity
and sense of self-efficacy are related to our work life and it is logical that the inability
to work would be associated with negative psychological outcomes.
The intercorrelations among study variables are shown in Table 10. The two
dependent adjustment variables, depression and quality of life, were significantly
negatively associated (r = -.78). Illness self-concept was strongly correlated with both
of the dependent variables: quality oflife (r = -.76) and depression (r = .67). The
independent variables (ISC support, optimism, illness intrusiveness, and functional
status) were significantly correlated with illness self-concept, quality oflife, and
depression, and were moderately correlated with each other (see Table 10).
The Fibromyalgia Impact Questionnaire (FIQ) contains two items which assess
depression and quality of life. These items are included in the measure of functional
status in fibromyalgia because anxiety and depression are common symptoms in this
population. However, in order to eliminate common variance shared by the FIQ and
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depression, these two items were eliminated. The modified version of the FIQ was
used in all study analyses.
Similarly, the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) is often adjusted in
fibromyalgia research to eliminate items that assess common fibromyalgia symptoms.
To adjust the BDI, three items addressing fatigue, sleep, and effort were eliminated to
create the BDI-Adjusted (BDI-A). The adjusted measure was used in all study
analyses. In addition, one item addressing suicide and suicidal ideation was eliminated
since, if endorsed, the study investigator was responsible for mandatory reporting of
harmful behavior. Since I wanted participants to feel that their confidentiality would
be maintained, as promised, this item was eliminated. It should be noted that since
four total items were taken out of the BDI, the overall score was affected. That is,
BDI-A depression scores in this study are somewhat deflated as compared to BDI
scores for chronically ill populations in other studies using the full range of questions.
Hypothesis One
All hypotheses were tested using hierarchical regression analyses with
demographic variables, including social desirability, entered in step I of the analysis.
Hypothesis I states that illness self-concept scores will predict quality of life and
depression, such that the more illness is central to the self, the poorer the quality oflife
and the greater the depression. To examine Hypothesis I, two hierarchical regression
analyses were conducted, with demographic variables (education, marital status,
stopped work, and social desirability) entered in step I, and illness self-concept
entered in step 2, with quality oflife and depression (BDI-A) scores as dependent
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variables (Tables 11a & b). After controlling for demographic variables, illness self-
concept accounted for an additional 39% of the variance in quality oflife scores (R2 =
.39, F(I, 97) = 113.85, p<.OOI).ln the second regression analysis, after controlling for
education, marital status, whether participants stopped work due to illness, and social
desirability, illness self-concept accounted for an additional 24% of the variance in
depression scores (R2= .24, F(I, 97) = 56.60, p<.OOI). Thus, the data support
Hypothesis 1.
Results for hypothesis 1 are presented in Tables 11a and 11b. Table 11a shows
that in step 2, only marital status remained a significant predictor of quality of life (p =
-.21, p<.OI), demonstrating that marital status is a strong predictor of quality oflife.
Table 11b shows that in step 2, education and social desirability remained significant
predictors of depression (P = -.16, p<.05 and P = -.26, p<.OOI, respectively). This
demonstrates that education and social desirability both strongly influence subjects'
reporting of depressive symptoms.
Hypothesis Two
Hypothesis 2 states that ISC support, optimism, illness intrusiveness and
functional disease status will predict illness self-concept. Specifically, this hypothesis
states that the poorer the ISC support (the more illness is reinforced as central to the
self-concept), the more pessimistic, the greater the illness intrusiveness, and the poorer
the functional status, the more likely illness will be incorporated as central to the self.
To examine Hypothesis 2, four regression analyses were conducted (Tables 12a-12d).
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The first analysis (Table 12a) examined ISC support as a predictor of illness
self-concept, controlling for education, whether participants stopped work due to
illness, and social desirability. After entering demographic variables in step I, ISC
support predicted an additional 16% of the variance in illness self-concept scores (R2 =
.16, F (I, 98) = 25.47, p<.OOI). Table 12a shows that whether participants stopped
work due to illness and social desirability remained significant predictors of illness
self-concept in step 2 (~= -.19, p<.05 and ~ = -.17, p<.05, respectively),
demonstrating that both of these variables are important variables in relation to illness
self-concept.
In the second regression analysis (Table I2b), after entering the demographic
variables in the first step (education, stopped work, and social desirability), optimism
predicted an additional 23% of the variance in illness self-concept scores (R2 = .23, F
(1,98) = 41.45, p<.OOI). Table 12b shows that in step 2, whether participants stopped
work due to illness remained a significant predictor of illness self-concept. However,
social desirability did not remain a significant predictor (although it was in the
previous analysis). This suggests that perhaps there is some shared variance between
social desirability and optimism in relation to illness self-concept that is accounted for
when optimism is entered into the model.
The third regression analysis (Table 12c) examined illness intrusiveness as a
predictor of illness self-concept, controlling for education, whether participants
stopped work due to illness, and social desirability. After entering the demographic
variables in step I, illness intrusiveness predicted 32% of the variance in illness self-
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concept scores (R2= .32, F (I, 98) = 69.28, p<.OOI). Table 12c indicates that education
remained a significant predictor of illness self-concept in step 2 of the analysis (~ = -
.19, p<.05). The fact that education remained a significant predictor when illness
intrusiveness was entered into the model is not surprising given that education and
illness intrusiveness were not significantly correlated (see Table 9), whereas education
correlated with all other study variables. This indicates that upon examining predictors
of illness self-concept so far, the contribution of education was accounted for by ISC
support and optimism, but not by illness intrusiveness.
The fourth regression analysis (Table 12d) examined functional status as a
predictor of illness self-concept, controlling for education, martial status, employment
status, whether a participant stopped working due to illness, and social desirability.
After entering demographic variables in step I, functional status predicted an
additional 8% of variance in illness self-concept scores (R2 = .08, F (I, 95) = 10.85,
p=.OOI). Table 12d reveals that in step 2 of the analysis, social desirability was the
only demographic variable to remain a significant predictor of illness self-concept (~ =
-.24, p<.05).
The results of the analyses indicate support of Hypothesis 2. That is, ISC
support, optimism, illness intrusiveness and functional status each predicted variance
in illness self-concept scores. The results confirm that personal, interpersonal, and
illness-related factors influence whether illness is incorporated as a central or
peripheral part of the self-concept and life space. In addition, some demographic
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variables contributed uniquely to illness self-concept, while others were accounted for
by the personal, interpersonal, and illness-related variables tested in hypothesis 2.
An additional analysis was conducted to examine the amount of variance in
illness self-concept scores accounted for by all four independent variables entered
together in step 2. ISC Support, optimism, illness intrusiveness, and functional status
were entered together as independent variables predicting illness self-concept. Results
indicate that after entering the demographic variables (education, marital status,
employment status, stopped work due to illness, and social desirability), the
independent variables accounted for an additional 44% of the variance in illness self-
concept scores (R2= .44, F (4, 92) =30.88, p<.OOI). With all four independent
variables in the model, illness intrusiveness and optimism remained significant
predictors of illness self-concept (P=.43, p<.OOI, and p=-.35, p<.OOI, respectively).
None of the demographic variables entered in step I remained significant in step 2.
Results for this analysis are reported in Table 13.
Entering ISC support, optimism, illness intrusiveness, and functional status
together to predict illness self-concept revealed a Multiple R of .82. This indicates that
the correlation between the predicted illness self-concept scores and the actual self-
concept scores was .82. This analysis demonstrates that these four variables,
hypothesized to account for whether illness was a central or peripheral part of
participants' self-concept, were successful in accurately predicting the criterion
variable. Furthermore, illness intrusiveness and optimism were especially important in
determining illness self-concept, such that the more intrusive the illness, and the less
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optimism reported by participants, the more likely illness was reported as central to
the self.
Hypothesis Three
Hypothesis 3 states that illness self-concept will contribute unique variance to
quality of life and depression scores, controlling for ISC support, optimism, illness
intrusiveness, and functional status separately (see summary Table 14). To examine
Hypothesis 3, eight hierarchical regression analyses were conducted (Tables 15a-
15h). Four analyses examined illness self-concept predicting quality oflife,
controlling for ISC support, optimism, illness intrusiveness, and functional status.
Four others examined illness self-concept predicting depression, controlling for ISC
support, optimism, illness intrusiveness, and functional status. Results for hypothesis
3, with quality oflife as the dependent variable are reported in Tables 15a, 15c, 15e,
and 15g. Results with depression as the dependent variable are reported in Tables 15b,
15d, 15f, and 15h.
In the first regression analysis (Table 15a), demographic variables (education,
stopped work, and social desirability) were entered in step I, ISC support entered in
step 2, and illness self-concept entered in step 3, with quality oflife as the dependent
variable. Results indicate that illness self-concept accounts for an additional 32% of
the variance in quality oflife scores, over and above ISC support (R2 = .32, F (I, 97)
=82.20, p<.OOI). In the second regression analysis (Table 15b), the same control
variables (education, stopped work, and social desirability) were entered into step I,
ISC support entered into step 2, and illness self-concept entered in step 3, with
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depression scores as the dependent variable. Results indicate that illness self-concept
accounts for an additional 16% of the variance in depression scores over and above
ISC support (R2 = .16, F (I, 97) =37.86, p<.OOI).
lt should be noted that education and social desirability remained significant
predictors of depression scores in step 3 of the second regression analysis (~= -.15,
p<.05 and ~ = -.26, p<.OOI, respectively). This suggests that education and social
desirability are strong predictors of depression, such that the poorer the education and
the less social desirability, the greater the reported depression. Standardized Beta
coefficients are conceptual1y similar to correlations in the sense that the magnitude of
each coefficient, with a range between -1.0 and 1.0, can be compared to determine
their relative importance in predicting the criterion variable. In step 3 of this analysis,
the Beta coefficient for illness self-concept ~ = .51 (p<.OOI), indicating that it is a
stronger predictor of depression than education or social desirability.
In the third regression analysis (Table 15c), demographic variables (education,
stopped work, and social desirability) were entered in step I, optimism in step 2, and
illness self-concept in step 3, with quality oflife as the dependent variable. Results
indicate that illness self-concept accounts for 17% of additional variance in quality of
life scores, over and above optimism (R2 = .17, F (I, 97) =52.38, p<.OOI).
The fourth analysis (Table I5d) entered demographic variables in step 1
(education, stopped work, and social desirability), optimism in step 2, illness self-
concept in step 3, with depression scores as the dependent variable. Results indicate
that illness self-concept accounts for an additional 9% of the variance in depression
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scores, over and above optimism (R2 = .09, F (1, 97) =24.12, p<.OOI). Optimism,
however, remained a significant predictor of quality oflife (~= .32, p<.OOI),
indicating that it is an important predictor of quality oflife. It should be noted that the
standardized Beta coefficient for illness self-concept in step 3 is ~ = -.56 (p<.001),
demonstrating that although optimism remains a strong predictor, by comparison,
illness self-concept is a more significant determinant of quality oflife.
The fifth analysis (Table 15e) entered demographic variables in step I
(education, stopped work, and social desirability), illness intrusiveness in step 2, and
illness self-concept in step 3, with quality oflife as the dependent variable. Results
indicate that illness self-concept accounts for 24% of additional variance in quality of
life scores, over and above illness intrusiveness (R2= .24, F (I, 97) =61.33, p<.OOI).
The sixth regression analysis (Table 15t) entered control variables (education, stopped
work, and social desirability) in step I, illness intrusiveness in step 2, and illness self-
concept in step 3, with depression scores as the dependent variable. Results indicate
that illness self-concept accounts for an additional 14% of the variance in depression
scores, over and above illness intrusiveness (R2 = .14, F (I, 97) =32.06, p<.OOI).
Education and social desirability scores remained significant predictors of depression
in step 3 (~= -.17, p<.05 and ~ = -.27, p<.OOI, respectively), suggesting that these two
variables are important predictors of depression. The standardized Beta coefficient for
illness self-concept in step 3 is ~ =.55 (p<.OOI), indicating that although education
and social desirability remain significant, illness self-concept is a much stronger
predictor of depression.
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The seventh analysis (Table 15g) entered demographic variables (education,
marital status, employment status, stopped work, and social desirability) in step 1,
functional status in step 2, and illness self-concept in step 3, with quality of life as the
dependent variable. Results indicate that illness self-concept accounts for 33% of
additional variance in quality of life, over and above functional status (R2 = .33, F (1,
94) =93.54, p<.OOI). It should be noted that marital status remained a significant
predictor of quality of life in step 3 (~ = -.20, p<.OI), indicating that marital status is
an important predictor of quality of life. The standardized Beta coefficient for illness
self-concept in step 3 is ~ = -.69 (p<.001), revealing that although marital status
remains a significant predictor, illness self-concept is a relatively stronger predictor of
quality oflife.
In the last regression analysis (Table 15h), demographic variables (education,
marital status, employment status, stopped work, and social desirability) were entered
in step I, functional status in step 2, and illness self-concept in step 3, with depression
scores as the dependent variable. Results indicate that illness self-concept accounts for
an additional 22% of the variance in depression scores, over and above functional
status (R2= .22, F (1, 94) =52.14, p<.OOI). Education, marital status, and social
desirability remained significant predictors of depression in step 3 (~ = -.18, p<.05, ~
= .14, p<.05, and ~ = -.24, p<.OI, respectively). However, the standardized Beta
coefficient for illness self-concept in step 3 is ~ = .57 (p<.OOI), revealing that illness
self-concept is a more important predictor of depression that any of the demographic
variables that remained significant.
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Summary
The eight regression analyses used to test hypothesis 3 reveal that illness self-
concept is an important predictor of quality oflife and depression, even after
controlling for the effects of ISC support, optimism, illness intrusiveness, and
functional status. Optimism and illness intrusiveness have received a lot of attention in
the literature examining adjustment in chronic illness. That illness self-concept
predicts adjustment equally or above these two variables is important. Hypothesis 3
also demonstrated which demographic variables are strong predictors of quality oflife
and depression in this population.
Additionally, the results of hypothesis 3 indicate that the Illness Self-Concept
Scale has discriminant validity. The fact that illness self-concept predicted variance
over and above social support, optimism, illness intrusiveness, and functional status,
demonstrates that the Illness Self-Concept Scale measured something other than what
was measured by the aforementioned variables.
To further establish the discriminant validity ofthis scale, two additional
hierarchical multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine illness self-
concept as a predictor of quality oflife and depression when all four variables, ISC
support, optimism, illness intrusiveness, and functional status were entered together
(see Table 16 a and b). In the first analysis, with quality oflife as the dependent
variable, demographic variables (education, marital status, employment status, stopped
work, and social desirability) were entered in step 1, ISC support, optimism, illness
intrusiveness, and functional status were entered in step 2, and illness self-concept was
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entered in step 3. Results indicate that illness self-concept accounts for an additional
8% of the variance in quality of life, even after controlling for all four variables (ISe
support, optimism, illness intrusiveness, and functional status) taken together (R2 =
.08, F (I, 91) =25.64, p<.OOI).
In the second multiple regression analysis, with depression as the dependent
variable, demographic variables (education, marital status, employment status, stopped
work, and social desirability) were entered in step 1, Ise support, optimism, illness
intrusiveness, and functional status were entered in step 2, and illness self-concept was
entered in step 3. Results indicate that illness self-concept accounts for an additional
4% of the variance in quality oflife, even controlling for all four variables (ISe
support, optimism, illness intrusiveness, and functional status) taken together (R2 =
.04, F (1,91) =11.16, p=.OOI).
These two analyses are important because they demonstrate that after
partialling out the effects of four variables, that have been previously shown to predict
quality oflife and depression, illness self-concept still accounts for significant
variance in the dependent variables. When conducting hierarchical regression
analyses, variables entered first in the regression model will retain any variance in
predicting the criterion variables that are shared with subsequent independent
variables. For example, if optimism and illness self-concept share variance in quality
of life scores, but optimism is entered in step 2 and illness self-concept is entered in
step 3, the shared variance will be represented in the coefficient for optimism. As a
result, the regression coefficients for variables entered earlier in the model may be
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somewhat inflated and the coefficients for the variables entered last may be somewhat
deflated. Consequentl y, the fact that illness self-concept accounted for an additional
8% of variance in quality of life scores and an additional 4% of variance in depression
scores, is noteworthy.
Additional Analyses
To further evaluate and delineate the construct of illness self-concept, several
additional analyses were conducted. Illness self-concept encompasses some aspects of
control, which are included in the sub-construct directionality. Directionality implies
that illness directs the self and other facets of the life space, or that the non-illness self
directs illness and other facets of the life space. While the concept of directionality
implies that either illness or the self are "in control", this is only a small aspect of the
overall illness self-concept construct. Analyses that examine control over illness and
specific symptoms are examined in order to demonstrate that illness self-concept is
more than simply control.
A second regression analysis was conducted in order to establish that illness
self-concept is more than depressive symptoms. To accomplish this, depression was
entered in a hierarchical regression predicting quality oflife, with illness self-concept
entered in a subsequent step. Lastly, the concept of victimization was examined in a
hierarchical regression to demonstrate that while victimization may be part of illness
self-concept, it is not a synonymous concept.
In order to distinguish illness self-concept from control over illness and
symptoms, two analyses were conducted (see Tables 17a and 17b). Pain and fatigue
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are the two primary symptoms of fibromyalgia and participants in the current study
were asked to rate the extent to which they have control over their pain and fatigue on
a ten point scale, with high scores indicating greater control. These two items were
used in the following analyses. Illness self-concept was entered as the independent
variable predicting quality of life and depression, controlling for participant-reported
control over pain and fatigue.
Results from the first regression analysis (Table 17a) indicate that after
entering demographic variables (education, stopped work, and social desirability) in
step I, control over pain and fatigue in step 2, and illness self-concept in step 3, illness
self-concept accounted for an additional 35% of variance in quality oflife scores (R2 =
.35, F(I, 96) =88.60, p<.OOI). Control over pain and fatigue did account for 8% of
variance in quality oflife scores (p<.01), but the standardized Beta coefficients for
these two variables were not significant in step 2 or step 3, when illness self-concept
was entered into the model. This suggests that while control over illness and
symptoms may be one aspect of illness self-concept, and may contribute some
variance to quality oflife scores, illness self-concept is a much broader concept.
In the second analysis (Table 17b), demographic variables (education, stopped
work, and social desirability) were entered in step I, control over pain and fatigue in
step 2, and illness self-concept in step 3, with depression scores as the dependent
variable. Results indicate that illness self-concept accounts for 21% of additional
variance in depression scores, over and above participant control over pain and fatigue
(R2= .21, F(I, 96) =47.25, p<.OOI). Control over pain and fatigue accounted for 5%
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(p<.05) ofthe variance in depression scores when added in step 2, but the standardized
Beta coefficients were not significant in step 2 or step 3, when illness self-concept was
added to the model. These results indicate that illness self-concept is a more global
construct than specific perceptions of symptoms and control over symptoms.
A regression analysis with illness self-concept predicting quality oflife
(adjustment), controlling for depression, was conducted in order to demonstrate that
illness self-concept is measuring more than simply depression (Table 18). This
analysis clarified that illness self-concept and depression are not overlapping
constructs and that depressive mood alone cannot explain adjustment to chronic
illness. Demographic variables (education, stopped work, and social desirability) were
entered into step I of the analysis, depression was entered in step 2, and illness self-
concept was entered in step 3, with quality of life as the dependent adjustment
variable. Results indicate that illness self-concept accounts for 12% of additional
variance in quality of life after controlling for depression (R2 = .12, F(l, 97) =38.27,
p<.OOI).
Depression accounted for 38% of additional variance in quality of life beyond
the demographic variables. However, since depression was entered into the analysis
prior to illness self-concept, any variance in adjustment shared by the two variables is
retained in the variable depression. In order to compare the contribution of depression
and illness self-concept to adjustment, the standardized Beta coefficients were
examined. In step 3, the standardized coefficient for depression is f3 = -.43 (p<.001),
and the standardized coefficient for illness self-concept is f3 = -.49 (p<.OOI).
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Comparing the two coefficients suggests that illness self-concept is a slightly stronger
predictor of quality of life, which is impressive considering the importance of
depression in influencing quality oflife. Additionally, this analysis indicates that
illness self-concept predicted quality of life at all levels of depression. This is
important because the study sample consists of many clinically depressed patients.
Self-esteem and depression are highly correlated in the general population
(Roberts & Monroe, 1999), and specifically in chronic illness (Symister & Friend,
2003). In order to demonstrate that illness self-concept is a construct apart from self-
esteem, and that self-esteem alone does not account for depression and quality oflife
in this sample, two regression analyses were conducted (Tables 19a and 19b). In the
first analysis, demographic variables (education, stopped work, and social desirability)
were entered in step I, self-esteem was entered in step 2, and illness self-concept in
step 3, with quality oflife as the dependent variable. Results indicate that illness self-
concept contributed an additional 19% of variance in quality oflife scores, over and
above self-esteem (R2= .19, F(I, 97) =54.00, p<.OOI). Self-esteem remained a
significant predictor of quality oflife (~= .29, p = .001) in step 3. However, illness
self-concept was a stronger predictor, ~ = -.59 (p<.001), indicating that illness self-
concept is more than simply self-esteem and that illness self-concept is a stronger
predictor of quality oflife in this sample.
In the second analysis, demographic variables (education, stopped work, and
social desirability) were entered in step I, self-esteem was entered in step 2, and
illness self-concept entered in step 3, with depression scores as the dependent variable.
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Results indicate that illness self-concept contributed an additional 7% ofthe variance
in depression scores, over and above self-esteem (R2= .07, F(I, 97) =19.00, p<.OOI).
When examining the standardized coefficients, it is apparent that self-esteem is a
strong predictor of depression (/3 = -.42, p<.OOO),as indicated in the literature (Roberts
& Monroe, 1999). Comparatively, illness self-concept maintained a significant but
slightly less powerful standardized Beta coefficient (/3 = .35, p<.OOI). These results
demonstrate that illness self-concept is a distinct construct apart from self-esteem and
that both variables are important predictors of depression in the current sample.
One concept that is relevant to people with chronic illness, and fibromyalgia
specifically, is a feeling of victimization. Physical symptoms, disruption to daily life,
functional status, and the psychological and social ramifications of chronic illness can
elicit feelings of victimization. While victimization may be one aspect of illness self-
concept, it is not all of it. In order to examine this proposition, two regression analyses
were conducted, with illness self-concept predicting quality of life and depression,
controlling for victimization (Tables 20a and 20b). Victimization was assessed by one
item that asked participants to rate the extent to which they felt victimized by their
illness, from (I) "not victimized" to (10) "very victimized".
In both analyses, demographic variables (education, stopped work, marital
status, and social desirability) were entered in step I, victimization in step 2, and
illness self-concept in step 3. Results indicate that illness self-concept predicts an
additional 19% of variance in quality of life, over and above feelings of victimization
(R2 = .19, F (I, 96) =54.95, p<.OOI). In step 2, victimization accounted for 21% of
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variance in quality oflife scores (p<.OOI). Comparing standardized Beta coefficients
in step 3, illness self-concept was a stronger predictor of quality oflife than was
victimization (~= -.63, p<.OOI and ~ = -.12, p = .14). The fact that the coefficient for
victimization dropped to non-significant when illness self-concept was entered into the
model suggests that victimization may be encompassed in the illness self-concept
construct.
The second regression analysis indicates that after demographic variables were
entered in step I, and victimization was entered in step 2, illness self-concept
accounted for an additional 8% of variance in depression (R2= .08, F (I, 96) =20.85,
p<.OOI). Degree of victimization accounted for 17% of variance in depression scores
(p<.001). In order to examine the comparative contribution of illness self-concept and
victimization to depression, the standardized Beta coefficients were examined. In step
3, the standardized coefficient for victimization was ~ = .19 (p =.03), and the
coefficient for illness self-concept was ~ = .43 (p<.001), indicating that illness self-
concept is a stronger predictor of depression. Furthermore, these results indicate that
while illness self-concept likely includes elements of victimization, it is a broader
construct.
Summary
Two scales were constructed for the purpose of this study, one to measure
illness self-concept, and the other to measure the extent to which illness is reinforced
as central to the self-concept. Both scales achieved good reliability. Cronbach's alpha
was .94 for the Illness Self-Concept Scale and .89 for the ISC Support Scale.
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Hypothesis one was supported by the data, indicating that illness self-concept
significantly predicted quality oflife (R2 !1= .39) and depression (R2 ('; = .24).
Hypothesis two was also supported by the data, which demonstrated that ISC support,
optimism, illness intrusiveness, and functional status each independently predicted
illness self-concept (~= .43, p<.OOI, ~ = -.54, p<.OOI, ~ = .63, p<.OOI, and ~ = .32,
p<.OI, respectively). Lastly, hypothesis three was supported by the data, indicating
that illness self-concept predicted unique variance in quality oflife and depression
scores, over and above the impact of ISC support (R2 ('; = .32 and .16, respectively),
optimism (R2('; = .17 and .09, respectively), illness intrusiveness (R2('; = .24 and .14,
respectively), and functional status (R2('; = .33 and .22, respectively).
The primary purpose of this study was to conceptualize and measure the extent
to which illness has come to permeate the self (illness self-concept) in patients with
chronic illness. A secondary purpose was to demonstrate that illness self-concept is
related to quality oflife and depression, such that the more illness occupies a central
position in the life space, the poorer the quality of life and the greater the depression.
The study also sought to identify variables that influence illness self-concept. Results
indicate that optimism, ISC support, illness intrusiveness, and functional status all
independently predict the extent to which illness is central to an individual's self-
concept. Lastly, the study sought to demonstrate the importance ofthe illness self-
concept construct in predicting adjustment in patients with chronic illness, relative to
other predictors. After accounting for the effects of optimism, social support, illness
intrusiveness, and disease severity, all variables that have been shown in the literature
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to predict adjustment, illness self-concept accounted for significant variance in quality
of life and depression.
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Discussion
The primary purpose of this study was to conceptualize the relationship
between the self and illness. Although prior researchers have speculated about the
nature of such a relationship (Ashmore & Contrada, 1999; Charmaz, 1999,2002;
Gullette, 1999) few have actually attempted to characterize the self in illness
(Beanlands, et aI., 2003, Devins, Beanlands, et aI., 1997; McCay & Seeman, 1998).
The conceptualization of the self and illness in the current research, illness self-
concept, is theory driven and characterizes the extent to which illness penetrates the
self-concept and regions of the life space. This conceptualization was successful in
predicting how people with fibromyalgia adjust to their illness in spite of disease
severity, and personal and interpersonal factors. The results of the study confirm that
"illness self-concept", as characterized in this study, is a psychological construct
which exists in persons with chronic illness, and which is related to adjustment.
The results of specific hypothesis tests provide evidence that illness self-
concept is an important variable in examining adjustment to chronic illness, and
demonstrate how the concept differs from other important psychological and illness-
related factors. In analyses evaluating the first hypothesis, illness self-concept was
established as a variable that contributes substantially to measures of adjustment in
chronic illness. Illness self-concept explained a large portion of the variance in
depression and quality of life by itself, and also remained an important variable when
compared with other known predictors of adjustment.
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Analyses testing hypothesis two confirmed that optimism, social support,
illness intrusiveness and functional status each influenced the extent to which illness is
either central or peripheral to the self. Following from hypothesis two, analyses testing
hypothesis three demonstrated that illness self-concept fared well in predicting
adjustment even after the effects of other important predictors were statistically
partialled out. Illness self-concept predicted substantial variance in quality oflife and
depression after controlling for the effects of optimism, social support, illness
intrusiveness, and functional status.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that the degree of optimism and illness
intrusiveness displayed in patients has a profound impact on how they adjust to illness
(Devins, Yitzchak, et aI., 1983; Devins, Armstrong, et aI., 1990; Devins, Mandin, et
aI., 1990; Scheier, et aI., 1989; Eitel, Hatchett, Friend, Griffin & Wadhwa, et aI., 1995;
Fontaine & Seal, 1997; Giltayet al., 2004; Symister & Friend, 2003). The fact that
illness self-concept was a more powerful predictor of adjustment controlling for these
variables speaks to the depth and breadth of this concept in characterizing how illness
affects the self. While illness self-concept encompasses aspects of optimism and
illness intrusiveness, it extends beyond these constructs as well.
Illness self-concept is also more than merely self-esteem. It would be easy to
assume that illness self-concept and self-esteem are synonymous since they both
address one's perceptions of the self. However, self-esteem and illness self-concept
each predict quality of life and depression uniquely, suggesting that they each impact
adjustment, but that they are separate entities. While self-esteem provides a broad
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measure of how self-perceptions are influenced in general (i.e., by evaluations of self-
worth), illness self-concept addresses how the self is perceived specifically in the
context of illness.
The main purpose of this study was to establish that illness self-concept is a
construct that is influenced by factors related to the self and the environment. The
measure of ISC support provides additional evidence that illness self-concept is
influenced by, and embedded in, a social context. ISC support assessed the extent to
which family and close friends are perceived to influence illness self-concept by either
reinforcing aspects of the non-illness self, or by reinforcing illness as central to the
self. The .55 correlation between illness self-concept and ISC support, and the fact that
ISC support predicts adjustment, suggests that illness self-concept is determined not
only by self-perceptions, but by how participants perceive that their social network
perceives them. The fact that illness self-concept is influenced by perceptions of
family and friends provides evidence that illness self-concept is a psychological
construct which is embedded in the social environment. However, the social
environment in the current study was only measured through perceptions of social
support and did not take into account received support (i.e., support as reported by
family and friends).
Distinguishing Illness Self-Concept From Other Research
Devins and colleagues conducted two studies, which are the only empirical
studies to date which attempt to measure the self-concept in chronic illness and link
self-concept with adjustment. There are notable differences between the way that
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Devins and colleagues (Devins, Beanlands, et aI., 1997; Beanlands, et aI., 2003)
conceptualized and measured self-concept in illness, and how the current study
conceptualized and measured illness self-concept. Devins characterized the self-
concept in illness as the situation where people identify themselves exclusively in
terms of their specific disease (i.e., as a "typical cancer patient" or a "typical kidney
disease patient"). Devins measured identification with a "typical patient" using the
Osgood Semantic-Differential technique (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbuam, 1957), which
asked participants to rate "myself as I am now" and "a typical patient" on potency
(strong-weak, hard-soft), evaluative (good-bad, kind-cruel) and activity (active-
passive, rash-cautious) dimensions. The difference scores between the two ratings
were then used to determine the extent to which participants viewed themselves as
similar or dissimilar to the "typical patient".
Using this technique, Devins (1997) found that identification with a typical
dialysis patient was associated with the potency and activity dimensions, but was not
associated with a self-view of good or bad (evaluative dimension), suggesting that
perceived similarity or dissimilarity to a typical patient does not represent a negative
or positive self concept. This may explain why self-concept was not related to
adjustment in this study. This technique places an emphasis on the self as negatively
influenced by illness (i.e., identity as a "dialysis patient"), but not on how individuals
withstand the effects of illness. Specifically, this conceptualization affords no
opportunity for participants to evaluate themselves compared to a healthy individual.
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The findings in the Devins et al. (1997) study were also weak in terms of
establishing a relationship between self-concept in illness and adjustment. Self-
concept, as measured by the Osgood semantic-differential technique was not related to
depression, measured by the CES-D. By contrast, in the current study, illness self-
concept demonstrated a strong relationship with depression (r = .67) as measured by
the BDI-A. Similarly, Devins et al. found no significant relationship between
similarity to a typical patient and psychological well-being, part of which was
measured by quality oflife. In the current study, however, illness self-concept
demonstrated a strong relationship with quality of life (r = .76). Thus, self-concept, as
measured by perceived similarity to a typical patient was not a significant predictor of
psychological adjustment in chronically ill patients, whereas illness self-concept, as
defined in this study, was a strong predictor of both depression and quality of life.
These findings demonstrate the utility of the illness self-concept construct, as
presented in this study, in predicting adjustment in chronic illness.
In a second study, also using the semantic-differential technique to measure
self-concept in illness, Devins and colleagues (2003) attempted to link the self-concept
to the typical bone marrow transplant patient, the extent of illness intrusiveness, and a
new concept called engulfment, to describe the experience of illness and treatment.
Engulfment, a concept taken from the mental health field with regard to self-
evaluation in schizophrenia (McCay & Seeman, I998), was defined as the situation
where illness and the patient role evolve to dominate the self-concept. This was
thought to occur largely through social interactions where the individual is perceived
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differently because of the stigma of illness. In the study, engulfment was hypothesized
to impact self-concept, such that the more engulfed a person was, the more likely they
would identify themselves as similar to a typical bone marrow transplant patient.
However, there was an omission in describing specifically what constitutes a typical
bone marrow patient. Findings indicate that engulfment did not correlate with self-
concept as a typical patient (r = .15), reaffirming that this characterization of self-
concept as similar to a patient was not sufficient to define the self in illness, at least
using the semantic-differential technique.
The concept of engulfment is distinguished from the current conceptualization
of self-concept on a number of dimensions. Theoretically, engulfment places a focus
on how individuals are consumed by illness, but does not identify how individuals can
preserve their sense of self in spite of illness. The absence of illness self-concept (i.e.,
a self-concept that is not consumed by illness and the patient role) is not explicitly
defined in engulfment theory. The construct of illness self-concept in the current study
emphasizes that while in some people illness may consume the self-concept, there are
many individuals who are able to preserve a sense of self in spite of illness, and the
results of the study indicate that this is the case.
The current theory of illness self-concept goes beyond mere description by
positing explicitly three different theoretical processes that help describe how illness
comes to permeate the self or how the self is preserved in the face of chronic illness.
Directionality, pervasiveness, and illness self-consciousness each describe a process
that reflects the extent to which illness is incorporated into the self-concept and life
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space or how the non-illness self, on the other hand, is preserved. Directionality refers
to the causal relationship between different regions of the life space (Lewin, 1951).
Specifically, it describes whether illness occupies a central region, where all other
regions of the self are influenced by illness, or whether the non-illness self is central
and illness is then interpreted in light of the self. Pervasiveness describes the extent to
which illness pervades many or few parts of the life space, and how much ofthe selfis
preserved from illness. Illness self-consciousness refers to the extent of consciousness
and preoccupation with illness.
Engulfment (measured by the Modified Engulfment Scale), which intends to
assess whether the self-concept is defined solely in terms of illness, appears to actually
be a heterogeneous concept which measures a number of different constructs,
including perception of self, optimism, pessimism, self-esteem, self-efficacy, social
comparison, illness intrusiveness, and fear ["I will probably need to be hospitalized
again" (pessimism), "My mind is normal" (self-view), "1 believe 1am more anxious
and nervous than most other people" (social comparison), "I am afraid oflosing my
mind" (fear), and "I am a damaged person by my illness" (self-esteem)) (McCay &
Seeman, 1998). Although some aspects ofthe self-concept are measured by
engulfment, the items are spread across many different constructs and appear not to
measure a single or unified process. Illness self-concept, by contrast, is clearly defined
in terms of three interrelated constructs which are relatively homogeneous and distinct
from other constructs, such as optimism, illness intrusiveness, and self-esteem.
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Other research (Charmaz, 1999,2002; Levine, 1999) appears to be relevant to
illness self-concept; however, upon careful examination, this research is not related to
the current conceptualization of self in illness. As discussed in the introduction,
Charmaz (1999; 2002) relates the experience of illness to acquiring a sick role and
describes a need to restructure the self through discarding old habits and forming new
ones that conform to the parameters of a given illness. Charmaz uses narrative of
chronically ill individuals to speculate about how chronic illness is experienced but
does not systematically quantify illness self-concept. Levine (1999) relates the concept
of identity salience to the evaluation of symptoms. Specifically, this work examines
how social identities in healthy individuals (e.g., rugby players and secretaries) can be
made salient, which then determines how specific symptoms are interpreted. This
research does not address persons who are diagnosed with a chronic illness or how
that chronic illness comes to permeate the self.
Illness Self-Concept in Fibromyalgia
The results of the current study demonstrate that illness self-concept in
fibromyalgia patients is an important predictor of adjustment. The nature of
fibromyalgia is such that there is not a singular effective treatment. Fibromyalgia
patients experience chronic widespread pain, severe fatigue, and a number of related
symptoms and disorders, including irritable bowel syndrome, restless legs, vertigo,
insonmia, and depression. Although there is a body of research providing evidence
that fibromyalgia is a disorder of the central nervous system (Bendtsen, Norregaard,
Jensen, & Olesen, 1997; Bennett, 1999), whereby patients become hypersensitive to
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sensory input (e.g., touch, smell), there is still a sense oflingering debate over the
etiology of the condition (Bennett, 2002, 2004).
The fact that fibromyalgia is not a well established condition in comparison to
other chronic illnesses may make fibromyalgia patients more vulnerable to having a
self-concept that is consumed by illness, particularly with regard to the illness self-
consciousness construct. There is also a stereotype of fibromyalgia patients as
consumed by victimization and depression. However, it is clear from the current study
that many fibromyalgia patients were able to withstand feelings of depression and
victimization and were able to preserve a sense of non-illness self. Illness self-concept
predicted quality oflife at all levels of depression and victimization. This result is
important because the present sample contained substantial numbers of individuals
who were considerably more depressed, and even more clinically depressed, than
many other chronic conditions (Symister and Friend, 1996,2003). This demonstrates
that illness self-concept goes beyond the degree of depression and victimization in
characterizing how the self experiences illness.
Illness Self-Concept and Denial
It could be said that the extreme case of illness as peripheral to the self is a
form of denial. However, in the current study, it was found that the more illness was
peripheral to the self, the better the outcomes in terms of quality of life and depression.
According to the current theory, the only situation where illness as central to the self
would possibly be beneficial is in the case of a life-threatening illness. Participants in
the current study were all diagnosed with fibromyalgia by a physician, and the nature
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of participating in this study required that they acknowledge their illness. Additionally,
there is no significant relationship between social desirability and functional status (r =
-.07), demonstrating that participants offered unbiased evaluations of their disease
status and were not denying or downplaying their illness.
Illness Self-Concept Across Illnesses and Treatment
It is likely that illness self-concept will vary across different chronic illnesses
and as a fimction of treatment. There may be aspects of fibromyalgia (i.e., lack of
treatment, skepticism) which make these patients more vulnerable to incorporating
illness as central to the self-concept. Similarly, unique aspects of other chronic
illnesses may present other vulnerabilities or protections. For example, end-stage renal
disease requires either a kidney transplant or dialysis treatment, which replaces the
fimction of the kidneys. Dialysis can take place in a clinic, performed by nurses, or it
can be done at home, by the patient. The type of treatment that an individual receives
may impact the processes (directionality, pervasiveness, and illness self-
consciousness) which determine illness self-concept.
If patients receive kidney transplants, they may have the opportunity to return
to the life and fimctioning they experienced prior to kidney failure. As a result, illness
may no longer occupy a central region of the life space. Illness self-consciousness will
decrease since they no longer have to undergo treatment and pervasiveness will
decrease as they resume activities. Kidney patients who receive dialysis treatment at a
center may report greater pervasiveness because of the duration of treatment (up to
four hours three times a week with commute time), but less illness self-conscious
73
because it is performed by a nurse. Those patients who perform dialysis at home may
report less pervasiveness because they can treat themselves on their own time and
without travel, but may report increased illness self-consciousness due to the
responsibility of managing their own treatment. The nature, course, and treatment
associated with an illness are likely to impact illness self-concept and the three
underlying processes.
Demographic Characteristics, Illness Self-Concept and Adjustment
Two issues were raised with regards to the demographic characteristics ofthe
current sample. One concerns the generalizability of the study, which is based in part
on how well the study sample represents the typical fibromyalgia population. The
second concerns some interesting findings with respect to this study's sample. The
demographic characteristics of the current sample are similar to other studies with
fibromyalgia patients. The mean age in the current sample was 53 (SO = 10),
demonstrating a skew toward older individuals, which is similar to other studies with
fibromyalgia patients where the mean age was 48 (SO = 10.32; Thieme, Turk, & Flor,
2004) and 60 (SO = 10.2; Oliver & Cronan, 2005). Mean length of diagnosis in the
current study was 9.7 years (SO = 7.45), with other studies reporting similar duration
of symptoms (M = 8.9, SO = 8.3; Burckhardt, et aI., 1994; M = 9, SO = 9.23; Thieme,
Turk & Flor, 2004). Sixty-three percent of the current sample were married, compared
with 74% and 72% in other studies. Thirty-seven percent were employed in the current
sample, versus 66% and 31% in other studies with fibromyalgia patients (Burckhardt
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et aI., 1994; Oliver & Cronan, 2005). Eighty-three percent of the current sample had at
least some college compared with 81% in another study (Oliver & Cronan, 2005).
The current sample was 95% female and 97% Caucasian. Epidemiologic
studies indicate that fibromyalgia is significantly more common in women than in
men, with prevalence rates for women in the general population being reported around
4.9% versus 1.6% in men (White et aI., 1999). One study indicated that the female to
male ratio for fibromyalgia cases reported in the clinic was 9: I (Miedema et aI., 1988).
The ethnic breakdown reported in the current study is in part a reflection of the ethnic
breakdown in the general population in Portland, Oregon and the surrounding areas,
which is predominantly Caucasian, and may in part be skewed because of the method
of recruitment (indirectly through the internet).
Consequently, it is important to think about the ways in which the
demographic characteristics of the current sample may have influenced responses to
study questions or the study results. Because the level of education in the current
sample is fairly high (83% had some college), depression may be lower than what
would be found in a sample ofless educated subjects since education and depression
are correlated (r = -.31). In the current study, there was a significant correlation
between gender and the outcome variables, with men (n = 5) reporting more
depression, poorer quality of life, and illness as more central to the self. This
correlation should be considered cautiously because of the small number of male
subjects, but could suggest that males who have fibromyalgia experience or report
worse outcomes than women. However, one study that compared psychological
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factors (stress, anxiety, depression and hassles) in men and women with fibromyalgia
reported no significant differences between gender (Yunus, Celiker & Aldag, 2004).
Limitations and Strengths
The current study is limited by the self-report and cross-sectional nature of the
data. Data that are strictly self-report bear some difficulty in interpretation, and may
increase measurement error. The nature of self-report is such that only the participant
presents perceptions of psychological adjustment, disease status, and other study
variables. Because information is only gleamed from one person, it is not possible to
rule out biases in the data that result from the state or traits specific to an individual.
For example, if a subject is depressed, there may be biases in how they perceive their
social support network and their functional status. However, it should be noted that
some of these effects can be controlled statistically. In the current study, after
controlling for depression, illness self-concept contributed significant variance to
quality of life, indicating that depression did not explain this relationship.
Social support data can be collected from the social network themselves, with
family and friends reporting their own perceptions of support and how they interact
with subjects or reinforce illness. In a similar way, physicians can provide measures of
functional status and disease severity that may be more objective than participant
reports. In the current study, I found it more meaningful to examine participants'
perceptions of their social network since perceptions of social support and objective
reports of social support may not be related and provide different types of information.
Perceptions of social support address the question of how people view their social
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network, whereas object measures of social support address the influence of received
support. In a follow-up study, it may be helpful to obtain a measure of both perceived
and received support to examine the relationship between the two types of support and
how each impacts illness self-concept and adjustment.
The current study collected reports of functional status only from the
perspective of participants, which may be influenced by pain, fatigue, and depression,
among other factors. Obtaining an objective measure of disease severity from a
physician may provide a way to determine if psychological variables and illness self-
concept influence physiological functioning and processes. In the case of
fibromyalgia, illness stems from central nervous system dysfunction where the body
becomes hypersensitive to sensory signals. Changes in psychological well-being and
illness self-concept (i.e., minimizing illness in the self) may influence this process,
such that the body responds less to pain and other sensory input.
Cross-sectional data, collected at only one point in time, provides a snapshot of
the relationships between illness self-concept, psychological adjustment, and
determinants of illness self-concept (e.g., optimism and illness intrusiveness).
Although the current study provided an illustration of the proposed relationships
between variables (see Figure I), it is possible that the variables interact in other ways.
For example, it is possible that depression influences illness self-concept, or that
depression influences optimism, which then influences illness self-concept. With only
cross-sectional data, it is impossible to disentangle these relationships.
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Transactional oriented research (Wemer, Brown & Altman, 2002) suggests
that various aspects of a given phenomenon fit together in a variety of ways, rather
than in a specific, unidirectional way. In the current study, it is possible that the
determinants of illness self-concept (ISC support, optimism, illness intrusiveness and
functional status) do not work in isolation, but interact with each other in important
ways to influence illness self-concept. Optimism may influence perceptions of support
and the extent of illness intrusiveness; perceptions of intrusiveness may be influenced
by the degree of support, and perceptions of support may influence functional status.
Transactional models also emphasize that relationships between variables may
change depending on circumstances. The current study describes such a scenario in the
introduction of this paper, proposing that changes in treatment (i.e., introduction of
new efficacious treatments) or the course of illness may signify changes in illness self-
concept and presumably psychological adjustment. Although the current study cannot
test alternative, more complex models of the study variables, data collected at a second
time point (which is currently underway) will be able to address some of these issues.
For example, with a second time point, I can test whether illness self-concept
contributes to changes in depression over time or the reverse.
Since the current conceptualization and measurement of illness self-concept
has only been tested with fibromyalgia patients, it is possible that the results found in
this study apply only to people with this condition. Although the concepts presented in
this study were developed with all chronic illnesses in mind, until they are tested in
other populations, it is premature to assume that they are generalizable outside of
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fibromyalgia. If illness self-concept is identified in other chronically ill populations,
the processes underlying illness self-concept (directionality, pervasiveness and illness
self-consciousness) may be differentially salient, affecting the parameters of illness
self-concept or the strength of the relationship between illness self-concept and
adjustment. As previously discussed, illnesses that require extensive treatment may
increase the pervasive impact of illness, whereas illnesses that are highly stigmatizing
may increase illness self-consciousness.
Strengths
The current study has several strengths, including support for all study
hypotheses, an excellent return rate in data collection, scale development and high
internal consistency for two new scales, and development of a theory in a difficult area
of research. This study collected data from fibromyalgia patients through a mailed
questionnaire. As reflected in the data, many of these patients were severely depressed
and all of them experience chronic widespread pain and fatigue. Of 171 eligible
participants, 109 completed and returned the questionnaire, yielding a 64% return rate.
This is impressive considering the physical and psychological symptoms experienced
by these participants and that the requirement was to complete a 16-page
questionnaire.
Two scales were developed explicitly for the purposes of the current study in
accordance with the theory of illness self-concept. The scales demonstrated high
internal consistency (a = .94 and .89) and all items contributed to the overall scales. In
addition, each scale contained items that addressed the three sub-constructs
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(directionality, pervasiveness and illness self-consciousness) and presented items that
reflected illness as both central and peripheral to the self. The data provided construct
validity for the scales as they correlated substantially with other variables that they are
assumed to be related to, but demonstrated discriminant validity by predicting
adjustment controlling for these variables. Time two data will help establish further
validity and test-retest reliability for the scales.
One of the most important strengths of this study was the development of a
theory and measurement tool to examine how the self is influenced by illness. While
the self in illness has been discussed at length in the literature (Ashmore & Contrada,
1999; Charmaz, 1999; Leventhal, Idler, & Leventhal, 1999; Ouellette, 1999), only two
studies have attempted to empirically test this relationship, presumably because it is a
difficult and complex issue. Devins, who has conducted numerous studies in chronic
illness (Beanlands, et aI., 2003; Devins, Armstrong, et al., 1990; Devins, Beanlands, et
aI., 1997; Devins, Edworthy, Seland et al., 1993; Devins, Mandin, et aI., 1990; Devins,
Mann, et aI., 1990; Devins, Seland, et aI., 1993), was not able to identify a
characterization of the self in illness that adequately predicted adjustment. It is a
notable accomplishment that this study developed a theory that sufficiently describes
the experience of the self in illness, and that the conceptualization was strongly related
to adjustment. Additionally, this study identified four determinants of illness self-
concept and established that the construct is independent of optimism, illness
intrusiveness, social support, functional status, self-esteem, victimization, and
depression.
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Implications
Results of the current study have significant implications for the field of
research and practice in chronic illness. Based on the findings of this study, illness
self-concept appears to be an important variable in adjustment to illness. The nature of
chronic illness is such that it is enduring and does not have a cure, and many
conditions do not have effective treatments. As a result, it is increasingly important to
examine the psychological aspects of illness in order to improve quality of life and
disease management. If illness self-concept is an important variable in determining
adjustment to illness, it can be targeted for change by physicians, psychologists and
patients.
Results of the current study indicate that when illness is central to the self-
concept, adjustment is poor. Accordingly, minimizing illness in the self-concept and
life space may lead to improvements in adjustment. One way this could be
accomplished is through expanding the life space. The extent to which illness is
central to the self may be a function of the expansiveness of an individual's life space,
such that illness self-concept is the ratio of illness to life space. When the life space is
extensive, illness occupies a smaller portion, compared to the situation where the life
space is constricted. An intervention could focus on expanding the life space in people
whose illness is central to the self. This could be accomplished by asking participants
to designate areas of their life that can be expanded (e.g., work, social life, passive
recreation), and proposing ways to extend them.
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Summary
The current study was successful in conceptualizing and measuring how the
self is influenced by chronic illness. The data support the theory posited, which
identifies three processes that determine whether illness is central or peripheral to the
self. The theory and concepts described in the current study introduce a psychological
construct which may be extremely valuable in predicting adjustment to chronic illness.
Future studies should examine illness self-concept in relation to various chronic
illnesses, specifically examining the three underlying constructs of directionality,
pervasiveness, and illness self-consciousness. Future studies should also identify
strategies to minimize illness in the self and life space in order to improve quality of
life and adjustment.
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Table 1
Illness Self-Concept Scale: Item-Total Correlations and Item Correlations with Social
Desirability
Item
Item Correlation
Item-Total with Social
Correlation Desirability
1. My illness is with me most of the time. .54** -.04
2. I am preoccupied with my illness. .73** -.26**
3. I have a positive view oflife, in spite of my illness. .67** -.26**
4. I try not to let my illness control how I feel. .52** -.16
5. My illness is at the center of who I am. .55** -.25**
6. My illness is often on my mind. .65** -.28**
7. I do not allow my illness to affect too many parts .74** -.25**
of my life.
8. I feel consumed by my illness. .78** -.25**
9. I only think of my illness when I have to. .56** -.19
10. My illness has undermined my confidence in .58** -.30**
myself and what I can do.
11. At times, it seems like my illness runs my life. .59** -.21 *
12. I have preserved my sense of self, in spite of my .59** -.16
illness.
13. It seems like almost everything I do is influenced .55** -.06
by my illness.
14. I do many of the same things as healthy others, .63** -.03
despite my illness.
15. My illness has affected nearly all aspects of my .58** -.04
life.
16. My illness prevents me from doing things I need .64** -.15
to do.
17. I do not let my illness take over my life. .68** -.18
18. I am dominated by my illness. .72** -.16
19. My illness has not kept me from doing the things I .60** -.04
enjoy doing.
20. My illness prevents me from being the kind of .65** -.30**
person I wish to be.
21. I see myself as a healthy person, in spite of my .60** -.24*
illness.
22. I rarely feel trapped by my illness. .64** -.17
23. My illness dictates nearly everything I do. .80** -.24*
Average Item-Total Correlation .63** .18
Note: '*Correlation significant at p<.OI, *Correlation significant at p<.05
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Table 2
Illness Self-Concept Subscale:
CC Items worded such that if endorsed, they reflect illness as central to the self.
13 Subscale Items
Item Mean = 3.69 SO = 1.07
My illness is at the center of who I am.
I feel consumed by my illness.
My illness has undermined my confidence in myself and what I
can do.
At times, it seems like my illness runs my life.
I am dominated by my illness.
My illness prevents me from being the kind of person I wish to be.
My illness dictates nearly everything I do.
My illness is with me most of the time.
It seems like almost everything I do is influenced by my illness.
My illness has affected nearly all aspects of my life.
My illness prevents me from doing things I need to do.
I am preoccupied with my illness.
My illness is often on my mind.
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Table 3
Illness Self-Concept Subscale:
Items worded such that if endorsed, they reflect illness as peripheral to the self.
Ten Subscale Items
Item Mean = 3.11 SD = 1.03
I have a positive view of life, in spite of my illness.
I try not to let my illness control how I feel.
I have preserved my sense of self, in spite of my illness.
I do not let my illness take over my life.
I see myself as a healthy person, in spite of my illness.
I rarely feel trapped by my illness.
I do not allow my illness to affect too many parts of my life.
I do many of the same things as healthy others, despite my illness.
My illness has not kept me from doing the things I enjoy doing.
I only think of my illness when I have to.
Table 4
Illness Self-Concept Subscales
Directionality Subscale Items
Item Mean = 3.09 SD = 1.04
I have a positive view of life, in spite of my illness.
I try not to let my illness control how I feel.
My illness is at the center of who I am.
I feel consumed by my illness.
My illness has undermined my confidence inmyself and what I
can do.
At times, it seems like my illness runs my life.
I have preserved my sense of self, in spite of my illness.
I do not let my illness take over my life.
I am dominated by my illness.
My illness prevents me from being the kind of person I wish to be.
I see myself as a healthy person, in spite of my illness.
I rarely feel trapped by my illness.
My illness dictates nearly everything I do.
Pervasiveness Subscale Items
Item Mean = 4.08 SD = 1.04
My illness is with me most of the time.
I do not allow my illness to affect too many parts of my life.
It seems like almost everything I do is influenced by my illness.
I do many of the same things as healthy others, despite my illness.
My illness has affected nearly all aspects of my life.
My illness prevents me from doing things I need to do.
My illness has not kept me from doing the things I enjoy doing.
Illness Self-Consciousness Subscale Items
Item Mean = 3.38 SD = 1.21
I am preoccupied with my illness.
My illness is often on my mind.
I only think of my illness when I have to.
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Table 5
Correlation Between Illness Self-Concept Subscales and Study Variables
Directionality
Pervasiveness
Illness Self-
Consciousness
Optimism
ISC
Support
Illness
Intrusive-
ness
Functional
Status Depression
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Quality
of Life
-.66"
-.51 **
-.48**
.55"
.50*'
.40**
.64'*
.71**
.50*'
.39'*
.49**
.33*'
.70*'
.53'*
.49**
-.78"
-.64'*
-.55**
Note: **Correlation significant at p<.O 1, *Correlation significant at p<.05
Table 6
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ISC Support Scale: Item-Total Correlations and Item Correlations with Social
Desirability
Item
I.Points out things I can do in spite of my illness.
2. Helps me focus on life apart from my illness.
3. Sometimes makes me conscious of my physical
limitations.
4. Makes me feel that I am a capable person.
5. Encourages me to be involved in activities that are
important to me.
6. Makes it seem as though my illness runs my life.
7. Treats me differently than healthy others in a way
that makes me feel incompetent.
8. Helps me take my mind offofmy illness.
9. Underestimates my ability to do things.
10. Reminds me that my illness does not define me.
II.Undermines my confidence in myself and what I
can do.
12. Makes me feel like Icannot to do much now that I
am ill.
13. Sometimes views me as a "sick" person in a way
that makes me feel helpless.
14. Helps me keep my illness in perspective.
Average Item-Total Correlation
Item
Correlation
Item-Total with Social
Correlation Desirability
.41 -.01
.58 -.08
.46 -.34"
.71 -.13
.65 -.02
.69 -.19
.44 -.14
.53 -.01
.38 .03
.57 -.09
.69 -.13
.65 -.11
.58 -.20'
.63 -.10
.57 .11
Note: "Correlation significant at p<.OI, 'Correlation significant at p<.05
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Table 7
ISC Support Subscales
Directionality Subscale Items
Item Mean = 2.28 SD = .92
Makes me feel that Ii am a capable person.
Makes it seem as though my illness runs my life.
Treats me differently than healthy others in a way that makes me feel
incompetent.
Underestimates my ability to do things.
Undermines my confidence in myself and what I can do.
Sometimes views me as a "sick" person in a way that makes me feel
helpless.
Pervasiveness Subscale Items
Item Mean = 2.45 SD = .92
Points out the things I can do in spite of my illness.
Encourages me to be involved in activities that are important to me.
Makes me feel like I cannot do much now that I am ill.
Illness Self-Consciousness Subscale Items
Item Mean = 2.75 SD = .85
Helps me focus on life apart from my illness.
Sometimes makes me conscious of my physical limitations.
Helps me take my mind off of my illness.
Reminds me that my illness does not define me.
Helps me keep my illness in perspective.
Note: **Correlation significant at p<.OI, *Correlation significant at p<.05
Table 8
Correlation Between lSC Support Subsca!es and Study Variables
Directionality
Pervasiveness
Illness Self-
Consciousness
Optimism
Illness
Intrusive-
ness
Illness
Self-
Concept
Functional
Status Depression
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Quality
of Life
-.35**
-.39**
-.44**
.46**
.32**
.42**
.50**
.50**
.46**
.29**
.24*
.20*
.47**
.43**
.43**
-.38**
-.47**
-.45**
Note: **Correlation significant at p<.Ol, "Correlation significant at p<.05
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Table 9
Correlation Between Study and Demographic Variables
Education Marital Employ- Stopped Length Etbnicity Age
Status ment Work of
Status Diagnosis
Illness Self-Concept -.28** .13 .19 -.31** .04 .17 -.06
ISC Support -.26** .09 .14 -.24* .03 .13 -.04
Optimism .26** -.14 .04 .IS .07 -.16 .11
Illness Intrusiveness -.12 .02 .11 -.34** -.04 .14 -.11
Functional Status -.28** .21* .33** .31** .06 .01 .04
Depression -.31** .2S** .04 -.23* -.06 .2S** -.09
Quality of Life .2S** 32** -.12 .23* .12 -.18 .03
Note: Sample sizes for correlations range from 98 to 109, depending on the variable.
**Correlation significant at p<.Ol, *Correlation significant at p<.05
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Table 10
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics of Study Variables
1 ;t 1 1 2 § 1 Ii
1. l1lness Self-Concept *
2. 1SC Support .55** *
3. Optimism -.63** -.45** *
4. Illness Intrusiveness .69** .47** -.39** *
5. Functional Status .44** .28** -.23* .48** *
6. Depression (BDI-A) .67** .51** -.66** .44** .31** *
7. Quality of Life -.76** -.48** .69** -.52** -.42** -.78** *
8. Social Desirability -.28** -.19 .33** -.24* -.07 -.39** .29** *
Means 79.04 34.78 21.26 53.21 46.11 16.54 14.23 7.58
Standard Deviation 22.53 10.97 5.03 16.59 12.81 9.35 4.62 2.99
5.71-
Possible Range 23-138 14-84 6-30 13-91 80.01 0-63 4-23 0-13
16.43-
Observed Range 28-130 14-68 6-29 12-91 77.10 2-43 4-23 0-13
Alpha .94 .89 .89 .87 .90 .87 .88
Note: **Correlation significant at p<.0 I, *Correlation significant at p<.05
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Table lla
Results for Hypothesis la: Illness Self-Concept Predicting Quality of Life
Predictor 12 R2 ilR2 Sig. F
Step I:
Education .22*
Marital Status -.28**
Stopped Work .18*
Social Desirability .27** .28 9.40***
Step 2:
Education .06
Marital Status -.21**
Stopped Work -.02
Social Desirability .09
Illness Self-Concept -.71 *** .67 .39 113.85***
Multiple R = .82
Note. *p <.05. ** P <.01. ***p<.OOI.
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Table lib
Results for Hypothesis Ib: Illness Self-Concept Predicting Depression
Predictor ft R2 ~R2 Sig. F
Step I:
Education -.29**
Marital Status .18*
Stopped Work -.17*
Social Desirability -.40*** .36 13.58***
Step 2:
Education -.16*
Marital Status .13
Stopped Work -.02
Social Desirability -.26***
Illness Self-Concept .56*** .59 .24 56.60***
Multiple R =.77
Note. *p <.05. ** P <.01. ***p<.OOI.
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Table 12a
Results for Hypothesis 2a: ISC Support Predicting Illness Self-Concept
Predictor 1l R2 ,A,.R2 Sig.F
Step I:
Education -.23*
Stopped Work -.28**
Social Desirability -.25** .23 9.65***
Step 2:
Education -.13
Stopped Work -.19*
Social Desirability -.17*
ISC Support .43*** .39 .16 25.47***
Multiple R = .62
Note. *p <.05. ** P <.01. ***p<.OOI.
Table 12b
Results for Hypothesis 2b: Optimism Predicting Illness Self-Concept
Predictor Ii R2 l>R2 Sig. F
Step 1:
Education -.23*
Stopped Work -.28**
Social Desirability -.25** .23 9.65***
Step 2:
Education -.11
Stopped Work -.22**
Social Desirability -.07
Optimism -.54*** .46 .23 41.45***
Multiple R = .68
Note. *p <.05. ** P <.01. ***p<.OOI.
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Table 12c
Results for Hypothesis 2c: Illness Intrusiveness Predicting Illness Self-Concept
Predictor ft R2 Ll.R2 Sig. F
Step 1:
Education -.23*
Stopped Work -.28**
Social Desirability -.25** .23 9.65***
Step 2:
Education -.19**
Stopped Work -.07
Social Desirability -.12
Illness Intrusiveness .63*** .55 .32 69.28***
Multiple R = .74
Note. *p <.05. ** p <.01. ***p<.OOI.
Table 12d
Results for Hypothesis 2d: Functional Status (FIQ) Predicting Illness
Self-Concept
Predictor Ii R2 i\R2 Sig. F
Step I:
Education -.22*
Stopped Work -.24*
Marital Status .09
Employment .07
Status
Social -.26** .24 6.08***
Desirability
Step 2:
Education -.16
Stopped Work -.17
Marital Slats .04
Employment .01
Status
Social -.24**
Desirability
Functional .32** .32 .08 10.85**
Status
Multiple R = .56
Note. *p <.05. ** P <.01. ***p<.OO1.
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Table 13
Additional Analysis For Hypothesis 2: Multiple Regression with ISC Support,
Optimism, Illness Intrusiveness, and Functional Status Predicting Illness Self-
Concept
Predictor 12 R2 i\R2 Sig. F
Step I:
Education -.22*
Stopped Work -.24*
Marital Status .09
Employment Status .07
Social Desirability -.26** .24 6.08***
Step 2:
Education -.05
Stopped Work .00
Marital Status .04
Employment Status .11
Social Desirability -.03
ISC Support .14
Optimism -.35***
Illness Intrusiveness .43***
Functional Status .05 .68 .44 30.88***
Multiple R = .82
Note. *p <.05. ** P <.01. ***p<.OO1.
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Table 14
Summary Table for Hypothesis 3: Illness Self-Concept Predicting Additional
Variance in Quality of Life and Depression Controlling for ISC Support,
Optimism, Illness Intrusiveness, and Functional Status
Quality of Depression
Life
R2Li R2Li
ISC Support
Optimism
Illness Intrusiveness
Functional Status
.32***
.17***
.24***
.33***
.16***
.09***
.14***
.22***
Note: All analyses controlled for education, stopped work and social desirability.
Marital status and employment status were controlled for in analyses with
functional status.
***All change statistics are significant at p<.OOI.
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Table 15a
Results for Hypothesis 3a: Illness Self-Concept Predicting Quality of Life Controlling
for ISC Support
Predictor l! R2 ~R2 Sig. F
Step I:
Education .23*
Stopped Work .20*
Social Desirability .29** .20 8.42***
Step 2:
Education .15
Stopped Work .13
Social Desirability .23*
ISC Support -.35*** .31 .11 15.10***
Step 3:
Education .06
Stopped Work -.01
Social Desirability .10
ISC Support -.04
Illness Self-Concept -.72*** .63 .32 82.20***
Multiple R = .79
Note. *p <.05. ** P <.01. ***p<.OOI.
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Table 15b
Results for Hypothesis 3b: Illness Self-Concept Predicting Depression Controlling for
ISC Support
Predictor 1l R2 ,A,.R2 Sig. F
Step I:
Education .29**
Stopped Work -.19*
Social Desirability -.41 *** .33 15.96***
Step 2:
Education -.21 **
Stopped Work -.11
Social Desirability -.35***
ISC Support .35*** .43 .10 17.63***
Step 3:
Education -.15*
Stopped Work -.02
Social Desirability -.26***
ISC Support .13
Illness Self-Concept .51*** .59 .16 37.86***
Multiple R = .77
Note. *p <.05. ** p <.01. ***p<.OOI.
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Table 15c
Results for Hypothesis 3c: Illness Self-Concept Predicting Quality of Life Controlling
for Optimism
Predictor 12 R2 L'.R2 Sig. F
Step 1:
Education .23*
Stopped Work .20*
Social Desirability .29** .20 8.42***
Step 2:
Education .09
Stopped Work .13
Social Desirability .07
Optimism .62*** .51 .31 61.43***
Step 3:
Education .03
Stopped Work .01
Social Desirability .04
Optimism .32***
Illness Self-Concept -.56*** .68 .17 52.38***
Multiple R = .83
Note. *p <.05. ** p <.01. ***p<.OOI.
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Table 15d
Results for Hypothesis 3d: Illness Self-Concept Predicting Depression Controlling for
Optimism
Predictor ~ R
2 t-.R2 Sig. F
Step 1:
Education .29**
Stopped Work -.19*
Social Desirability -.41 *** .33 15.96***
Step 2:
Education -.18*
Stopped Work -.13
Social Desirability -.24**
Optimism -.51*** .53 .20 42.25***
Step 3:
Education -.13*
Stopped Work -.04
Social Desirability -.21**
Optimism -.28**
Illness Self-Concept .42*** .62 .09 24.12***
Multiple R = .79
Note. *p <.05. ** p <.01. ***p<.OOI.
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Table 15e
Results for Hypothesis 3e: Illuess Self-Concept Predicting Quality of Life Controlling
for Illness Intrusiveness
Predictor ft R2 L\R2 Sig. F
Step I:
Education .23*
Stopped Work .20*
Social Desirability .29** .20 8.42***
Step 2:
Education .20*
Stopped Work .04
Social Desirability .19*
Illness Intrusiveness -.48*** .39 .19 29.67***
Step 3:
Education .07
Stopped Work -.01
Social Desirability .10
Illness Intrusiveness -.02
Illness Self-Concept -.72*** .63 .24 61.33***
Multiple R = .79
Note. *p <.05. ** p <.01. ***p<.OO1.
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Table 15f
Results for Hypothesis 3f: Illness Self-Concept Predicting Depression Controlling for
Illness Intrusiveness
Predictor !l R2 i1R2 Sig. F
Step I:
Education .29**
Stopped Work -.19*
Social Desirability -AI *** .33 15.96***
Step 2:
Education -.27**
Stopped Work -.06
Social Desirability -.33***
Illness Intrusiveness .37*** 044 .11 19.84***
Step 3:
Education -.17*
Stopped Work -.02
Social Desirability -.27***
Illness Intrusiveness .03
Illness Self-Concept .55*** .58 .14 32.06***
Multiple R = .76
Note. *p <.05. ** p <.Ol. ***p<.OOl.
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Table 15g
Results for Hypothesis 3g: lllness Self-Concept Predicting Quality of Life Controlling
for Functional Status
Predictor 1l R2 t.R
2 Sig. F
Step I:
Education .22*
Stopped Work .16
Marital Status -.28**
Employment Status -.01
Social Desirability .27* .28 7.46***
Step 2:
Education .17
Stopped Work .10
Marital Status -.23**
Employment Status .04
Social Desirability .25**
Functional Status -.29** .35 .07 9.8**
Step 3:
Education .06
Stopped Work -.02
Marital Status -.20**
Employment Status .05
Social Desirability .09
Functional Status -.08
Illness Self-Concept -.69*** .67 .33 93.53***
Multiple R = .82
Note. *p <.05. ** P <.Ol. ***p<.OOl.
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Table ISh
Results for HyPothesis 3h: Illness Self-Concept Predicts Depression Controlling for
Functional Status
Predictor ~ R
2 L',.R2 Sig. F
Step I:
Education -.31 ***
Stopped Work -.19*
Marital Status .19*
Employment Status -.09
Social Desirability -.38*** .37 11.02***
Step 2:
Education -.27**
Stopped Work -.16
Marital Status .16
Employment Status -.12
Social Desirability -.37***
Functional Status .17 .39 .02 3.62
Step 3:
Education -.18*
Stopped Work -.06
Marital Status .14*
Employment Status -.13
Social Desirability -.24**
Functional Status -.01
lllness Self-Concept .57*** .61 .22 52.14***
Multiple R = .78
Note. *p <.05. ** p <.01. ***p<.OO1.
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Table 16a
Additional Analysis For Hypothesis 3: Illness Self-Concept Predicting Quality of Life,
Controlling for ISC Support, Optimism, lllness Intrusiveness, and Functional Status
Predictor 12 R' Ll.R' Sig. F
Step I:
Education .22*
Stopped Work .16
Marital Status -.28**
Employment Status -.01
Social Desirability -.27** .28 7.46***
Step 2:
Education .04
Stopped Work -.03
Marital Status .20**
Employment Status -.01
Social Desirability .05
ISC Support -.07
Qptimism .49***
Illness Intrusiveness -.24**
Functional Status -.11 .65 .37 24.08***
Step 3:
Education .02
Stopped Work -.03
Marital Status -.19**
Employment Status .00
Social Desirability .03
ISC Support -.01
Qptimism .32***
lilness Intrusiveness -.03
Functional Status -.08
lllness Self-Concept -.49*** .73 .08 25.64***
Multiple R = .82
Note. *p <.05. ** p <.01. ***p<.OOI.
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Table 16b
Additional Analysis For Hypothesis 3: Illness Self-Concept Predicting Depression
Controlling for ISC Support, Optimism, Illness Intrusiveness, and Functional Status
Predictor ~ R' tlR' Sig. F
Step 1:
Education .31***
Stopped Work -.19*
Marital Status -.19*
Employment Status -.07
Social Desirability -.38*** .37 11.02***
Step 2:
Education -.16*
Stopped Work -.04
Marital Status .14*
Employment Status -.04
Social Desirability -.20**
ISC Support .15
Optimism -.37***
Illness Intrusiveness .18*
Functional Status .02 .61 .24 13.93***
Step 3:
Education -.14*
Stopped Work -.04
Marital Status .12
Employment Status -.08
Social Desirability -.19**
ISC Support .10
Optimism -.24**
Illness Intrusiveness ,02
Functional Status .00
Illness Self-Concept .37** .65 .04 11.16**
Multiple R = .82
Note. *p <.05. ** p <.01. ***p<.OOI.
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Table 17a
Additional Analysis: Illness Self-Concept Predicting Quality of Life Controlling for
Control of Symptoms
Predictor Jl R2 tiR2 Sig. F
Step I:
Education .23*
Stopped Work .20*
Social Desirability -.29** .20 8.43***
Step 2:
Education .19*
Stopped Work .19*
Social Desirability .24**
Control Over Pain .19
Control Over Fatigue .14 .28 .08 5.25**
Step 3:
Education .06
Stopped Work -.00
Social Desirability .11
Control Over Pain .04
Control Over Fatigue -.04
Illness Self-Concept -.74*** .63 .35 88.60***
Multiple R = .79
Note. *p <.05. ** P <.OI. ***p<.OOI.
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Table 17b
Additional Analysis: Illness Self-Concept Predicting Depression Controlling for
Control of Symptoms
Predictor ft R2 L'1R2 Sig.F
Step 1:
Education -.29**
Stopped Work -.19*
Social Desirability -.4 I *** .33 15.96***
Step 2:
Education -.26**
Stopped Work -.18
Social Desirability -.38***
Control Over Pain -.15 .38 .05 3.58*
Control Over Fatigue -.10
Step 3:
Education -.16*
Stopped Work -.03
Social Desirability -.27***
Control Over Pain -.03
Control Over Fatigue .04
Illness Self-Concept .57*** .59 .21 47.25***
Multiple R = .76
Note. *p <.05. ** P <.01. ***p<.OOI.
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Table 18
Additional Analysis: Illness Self-Concept Predicting Quality of Life Controlling for
Depression
Predictor ~ R
2 ~R2 Sig. F
Step 1:
Education .23*
Stopped Work .20*
Social Desirability -.29** .20 8.43***
Step 2:
Education .01
Stopped Work .06
Social Desirability -.02
Depression -.76*** .58 .38 91.16***
Step 3:
Education -.01
Stopped Work -.02
Social Desirability -.02
Depression -.43***
lllness Self-Concept -.49*** .70 .12 38.27***
Multiple R = .84
Note. *p <.05. ** p <.01. ***p<.OOI.
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Table 19a
Additional Analysis: Illness Self-Concept Predicting Quality of Life Controlling for
Self-Esteem
Predictor 1l R2 L'.R2 Sig. F
Step 1:
Education .23*
Stopped Work .20*
Social Desirability .28** .20 8.43***
Step 2:
Education .06
Stopped Work .14
Social Desirability .05
Self-Esteem .62*** .48 .28 52.56***
Step 3:
Education .02
Stopped Work .01
Social Desirability .03
Self-Esteem .27**
lllness Self-Concept -.59*** .67 .19 54.00***
Multiple R = .82
Note. *p <.05. ** P <.01. ***p<.OOI.
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Table 19b
Additional Analysis: Illness Self-Concept PredictingDepression Controlling for Self-
Esteem
Predictor J2 R2 ,',R2 Sig. F
Step I:
Education -.29**
Stopped Work -.19*
Social Desirability -.41 *** .33 15.96***
Step 2:
Education -.12
Stopped Work -.12
Social Desirability -.17*
Self-Esteem -.62*** .61 .28 68.95***
Step 3:
Education -.09
Stopped Work -.05
Social Desirability -.16*
Self-Esteem -.42***
Illness Self-Concept .35*** .68 .07 19.00***
Multiple R = .82
Note. *p <.05. ** P <.01. ***p<.OOI.
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Table 20a
Additional Analysis: Illness Self-Concept Predicting Quality of Life Controlling for
Victimization
Predictor Ji R2 L'.R2 Sig. F
Step I:
Education .22*
Stopped Work .18*
Marital Status -.26**
Social Desirability .27** .28 9.40***
Step 2:
Education .16*
Stopped Work .12
Marital Status -.27**
Social Desirability .16*
Victimization -.48*** .49 .21 40.20***
Step 3:
Education .06
Stopped Work -.01
Marital Status -.22***
Social Desirability .09
Victimization -.12
lllness Self-Concept -.63*** .68 .19 54.95***
Multiple R = .82
Note. *p <.05. ** P <.01. ***p<.OOI.
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Table 20b
Additional Analysis: Illness Self-Concept Predicting Depression Controlling for
Victimization
Predictor ft R2 ~R2 Sig. F
Step 1:
Education -.29**
Stopped Work -.17*
Marital Status .18*
Social Desirability -.40*** .36 13.58***
Step 2:
Education -.24**
Stopped Work -.12
Marital Status .17*
Social Desirability -.30***
Victimization .44*** .53 .17 35.73***
Step 3:
Education -.17*
Stopped Work -.03
Marital Status .14*
Social Desirability -.25***
Victimization .19*
Illness Self-Concept .43*** .61 .08 20.85***
Multiple R = .78
Note. *p <.05. ** p <.01. ***p<.OO1.
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Figure 2, Box and Whisker Plot of the Illness Self-Concept Scale,
.r: ±Std. Dev.
c::::::::J ±Std. Err."
o Mean. ,C'
P = Items worded to represent illness as central to the self
N = Items worded to represent the ability to preserve the self
Figure 3. Distribution of the Illness Self-Concept Scale.
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Illness Self-Concept Scale Total
140.00
Mean = 79.04
Std. Dev.= 22.53
N = 109
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Figure 4. Box & Whisker Plot of the ISC Support Scale.
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P ~ Items worded to represent a social network that reinforces illness as central to the self
N ~ Items worded to represent a social network that reinforces illness as peripheral to the
self
Figure 5. Distribution of the ISC Support Scale.
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Appendix A
Illness Self-Concept Scale
The foUowing items ask about how fibromyalgia affects you. CIRCLE the number that corresponds to how you
feel. Please use tbe foDowing scale:
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agree Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agr",
I.My illness is with Ire rmst of the titre. 2 3 4 5 6
2. I am preoccupied with my illness. 2 3 4 5 6
3. I have a positive view of life, in spite ofmy illness. 2 3 4 5 6
4.1 try not to let my illness control how I feel. 2 3 4 5 6
5. My illness is at the center of'wbo I am 2 3 4 5 6
6. My illness is often on my mind 2 3 4 5 6
7. I do not allow my illness to affect too many parts of 2 3 4 5 6
my life.
8. I feel consumed by my illness. 2 3 4 5 6
9. I only thinkofmy illness when I have to. 2 3 4 5 6
10. My illness has undermined my confidence in myself 2 3 4 5 6
and what I can do.
11. At rices, it seems like my illness runs my life. 2 3 4 5 6
12. I have preserved my sense of self, in spite of my 2 3 4 5 6
illness.
13. It seem; like almost everything I do is influenced by 2 3 4 5 6
my illness.
14. I do mmy of the same things as healthy others, 2 3 4 5 6
despite my illness.
15. My illness has affected nearly all aspects afmy life. 2 3 4 5 6
16. My illness prevents Ire from doing things I need to 2 3 4 5 6
do.
17. I do rot let my illness take over my life. 2 3 4 5 6
18. I am dominated by my illness. 2 3 4 5 6
19. My illness has not kept me fromdoing tbethings I 2 3 4 5 6
enjoy doing.
20. My illness prevents Ire from being the kind of 2 3 4 5 6
person that I wish to be
21. I see myselfas a healthy person, in spite of my 2 3 4 5 6
illness.
22. I rarely reel trapped by my illness. 2 3 4 5 6
23. My illness dictates nearly everything I do. 2 3 4 5 6
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Appendix B
ISC Support Scale
The foUowing items refer to your social support network (your spouse or partner, fami.ly, and dose friends).
CIRCLE the number that corresponds to how you feel. Please respond to the questions below using this scale:
Strongly Disagree Somewhat Somewhat Agr-ee Strongly
Disagree Disagree Agree Agree
My social support network ...
I. Points out the things I can do in spite of my 2 3 4 5 6
illness.
2. Helps me focus on life apart from my illness. 2 3 4 5 6
3. Sometimes makes me conscious of my physical 2 3 4 5 6
limitations.
4. Makes me feel that I am a capable person. 2 3 4 5 6
5. Encourages me to be involved in activities that 2 3 4 5 6
are important to me.
6. Makes it seem as though my illness runs my life. 2 3 4 5 6
7. Treats me differently than healthy others in a 2 3 4 5 6
way that makes me feel incompetent.
8. Helps me take my mind off of my illness. 2 3 4 5 6
9. Underestimates my ability to do things. 2 3 4 5 6
10. Reminds me that my illness does not define 2 3 4 5 6
me.
II. Undermines my confidence in myself and what 2 3 4 5 6
I can do.
12. Makes me feel like I cannot do much now that 2 3 4 5 6
Iam ill.
13. Sometimes views me as a "sick" person in a 2 3 4 5 6
way that makes me feel helpless.
14. Helps me keep my illness in perspective. 2 3 4 5 6
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Appendix C
Illness Intrusiveness Ratings Scale
The following items ask about how much your illness and/or its treatment interfere with different aspects of your
life. Please CIRCLE the number that best describes your current life situation. If an item is not applicable, please
circle the number one (1) to indicate that this aspect of your life is not affected very much. Please do not leave any
item unanswered.
How much does your illness and/or Not very Very
its treatment interfere with your: Much Much
I. Health 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. Diet (i.e., the things you eat and 2 3 4 5 6 7
drink)
3. Work 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. Active recreation (e.g., sports) 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. Passive recreation (e.g., reading, 2 3 4 5 6 7
listening to music)
6. Financial situation 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Relationship with your spouse 2 3 4 5 6 7
(girlfriend or boyfriend if not
married)
8. Sex life 2 3 4 5 6 7
9. Family relationships 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. Other social relationships 2 3 4 5 6 7
II. Self-expressioniSelf- 2 3 4 5 6 7
improvement
12. Religious expression 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. Community and civic 2 3 4 5 6 7
involvement
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Appendix D
Fibromyalgia Impact Questionnaire (FIQ)
Directions: For questions 1 through 11, please CIRCLE the number that best describes how
you did overall for the past week. If you don't normally do something that is asked, cross the
question out.
Always Most Occasionally Never
Were you able to ... Times
1. Do shopping? 0 2 3
2. Do laundry with a washer/dryer? 0 2 3
3. Prepare meals? 0 2 3
4. Wash dishes/cooking utensils by hand? 0 2 3
5. Vacuum a rug? 0 2 3
6. Make beds? 0 1 2 3
7. Walk several blocks? 0 1 2 3
8. Visit friends or relatives? 0 2 3
9. Do yard work? 0 2 3
10. Drive a car? 0 2 3
11. Climb stairs? 0 2 3
12. Of the 7 days in the past week, how many days did you feel good?
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13. How many days last week did you miss work, including housework, because offibromyalgia?
o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Directions: For the remaining items, place a mark like this / at the point on the line
that best indicates how you feIt overall for the past week.
14. When you worked, how much did pain or other symptoms of your fibromyalgia interfere
with your ability to do your work, including housework?
No problem with work Great difficulty with work
15. How bad has your pain been?
I-- -- -- ---- ----------
No pain Severe pain
16. How tired have you been?
No tiredness Very tired
17. How have you felt when you get up in the morning?
Awoke well rested Awoke very tired
18. How bad has your stiffness been?
No stiffness Very stiff
19. How nervous or anxious have you felt?
I
Not anxious-- -- -- -- -- -- -- Very anxious
20. How depressed or blue have you felt?
I-- -- -- ---- -- -- ------
Not depressed Very depressed
21. How victimized do you feel by your illness?
Not victimized Very victimized
22. How much control do you have over your pain?
No control A lot of control
23. How much control do you have over your fatigue?
No control A lot of control
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Appendix E
Life Orientation Test- Revised (LOT-R)
Please indicate the extent to which yon agree with each of the following statements. CIRCLE
the number that corresponds to how you feel.
Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree
1. In uncertain times, I usually expect the 2 3 4 5
best.
2. It's easy for me to relax. 2 3 4 5
3. If something can go wrong for me, it will. 2 3 4 5
4. I'm always optimistic about the future. 2 3 4 5
5. I enjoy friends a lot. 2 3 4 5
6. It's important for me to keep busy. 2 3 4 5
7. I hardly ever expect things to go my way. 2 3 4 5
8. I don't get upset too easily. 2 3 4 5
9. Overall, I expect more good things to 2 3 4 5
happen to me than bad.
10. I rarely count on good things happening to 2 3 4 5
me.
Appendix F
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale
Read each statement carefully, then CIRCLE TRUE or FALSE for each item:
1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not
encouraged.
2. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.
3. On a few occasions, I have given up doing something because I
thought too little of my ability.
4. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in
authority even though I knew they were right.
5. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener.
6. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone.
7. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.
8. I sometimes try to get even, rather than forgive and forget.
9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable.
10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different
from my own.
II. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune
of others.
12. I sometimes get irritated by people who ask favors of me.
13. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone else's
feelings.
True False
True False
True False
True False
True False
True False
True False
True False
True False
True False
True False
True False
True False
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Appendix G
Quality of Life
CIRCLE the number that corresponds to bow you feel:
I. I generally feel in good spirits.
1
Always true
2
Often true
2. I fmd a good deal of happiness in life.
1
Always true
2
Often true
3
Sometimes
true
3
Sometimes
true
4
Seldom
true
4
Seldom
true
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5
Never
true
5
Never
true
3. Everything considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied would you say you are with your life these days?
1
Very
satisfied
2
Satisfied
3
Somewhat
satisfied
4
Neutral
5
Somewhat
dissatisfied
4. Everything considered, how would you rate your present life?
1
Not
satisfactory
2
Clearly below
average
3
A little below
average
4
A little above
average
6
Dissatisfied
5
Clearly above
average
7
Very
dissatisfied
6
Very good
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Appendix H
Beck Depression Inventory (BD I)
Please read each group of statements carefully. Then pick out the one statement in each
group which best describes the way you have been feeling the past month. including today.
CIRCLE the number beside the statement you picked. If several statements in tbe group
seem to apply equally well, circle each one. Be sure to read all the statements in each group
before making your choice.
o I do not feel sad.
I I feel sad.
2 I am sad all the time and I can't snap out of it.
3 I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it.
o I am not particularly discouraged about the future.
1 I feel discouraged about the future.
2 I feel I have nothing to look forward to.
3 I feel that the future is hopeless and that things cannot improve.
o I do not feel like a failure.
1 I feel I have failed more than the average person.
2 As I look back on my life, all I can see is a lot of failures.
3 I feel I am a complete failure as a person.
o I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to.
I I don't enjoy things the way I used to.
2 I don't get real satisfaction out of anything anymore.
3 I am dissatisfied or bored with everything.
o I don't feel particularly guilty.
1 I feel guilty a good part of the time.
2 I feel quite guilty most of the time.
3 I feel guilty all of the time.
o I don't feel I am being punished.
I I feel I may be punished.
2 I expect to be punished.
3 I feel I am being punished.
o I don't feel disappointed in myself.
I I am disappointed in myself.
2 I am disgusted with myself.
3 I hate myself.
o I don't feel I am any worse than anybody else.
1 I am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes.
2 I blame myself all the time for my faults.
3 I hlame myself for everythiog had that happens.
o I don't cry any more than usual.
1 I cry more now than I used to.
2 I cry all the time now.
3 I used to be able to cry, but now I can't cry even though I want to.
o I am no more irritated now than I ever am.
I I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to.
2 I feel irritated all the time now.
3 I don't get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate me.
o I have not lost interest in other people.
I I am less interested in other people than I used to be.
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people.
3 I have lost all of my interest in other people.
o I make decisions about as well as I ever could.
t I put off making decisions more than I used to.
2 I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before.
3 I can't make decisions at all anymore.
o I don't feel I look any worse than I used to.
I I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive.
2 I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me look unattractive.
3 I believe that I look ugly.
o I can work about as well as before.
I It takes an extra effort to get started at doing something.
2 I have to push myself very hard to do anything.
3 I can't do any work at all.
o I can sleep as well as usual.
t I don't sleep as well as I used to.
2 I wake up one to two hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get back to sleep.
3 I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to sleep.
o I don't get more tired than usual.
I I get tired more easily than I used to.
2 I get tired from doing almost anything.
3 I am too tired to do anything.
o My appetite is no worse than usual.
t My appetite is not as good as it used to be.
2 My appetite is much worse now.
3 I have no appetite at all anymore.
o I haven't lost much weight, if any lately.
I I have lost more than 5 pounds.
2 I have lost more than 10 pounds.
3 I have lost more than 15 pounds.
I am purposely trying to lose weight by eating less (Circle one).
1 Yes
2 No
o I am no more worried about my health than usual.
I I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains, or upset stomach, or
constipation.
2 I am very worried about physical problems and it's hard to think or do much else.
3 I am so worried about my physical problems that I cannot think about anything else.
o I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex.
I I am less interested in sex than I used to be.
2 I am much less interested in sex now.
3 I have lost interest in sex completely.
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